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Clarifying Costs: Can Increased Price 
Transparency Reduce Healthcare Spending? 
 
Morgan A. Muir,*1Stephanie A. Alessi,**2 and Jaime S. King***3  
 
As healthcare expenditures continue to climb, politicians, business leaders, and patients 
avidly search for new methods to reduce healthcare costs.  In an eleven-point plan released in 
2012, a group of the nation’s top healthcare experts listed “full transparency of prices” as one 
potential solution to reduce healthcare costs.  The experts, some of whom helped write the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, argued that price transparency would allow 
consumers to compare prices before choosing a provider or hospital and, consequently, better 
anticipate their overall costs.  In turn, they argued that making price information publicly 
accessible would also reduce excess healthcare spending by encouraging providers to offer more 
competitive pricing.  
Other health services research, however, suggests that legislative and regulatory efforts 
to promote price transparency may result in increased healthcare costs depending on the market 
conditions and the various stakeholders targeted.  Consequently, any price transparency 
initiative must not only make prices transparent, but also account for the differences between 
markets, either by reducing the economic inefficiencies that keep price transparency from being 
effective or by precisely targeting the specific regions where the market would support such an 
initiative.   
This article analyzes whether price transparency initiatives can effectively reduce 
healthcare costs, and if so, what conditions must exist for them to do so.  The features of a well-
designed price transparency initiative will vary depending upon the targeted population 
(patients, employers, providers, or insurers) and the particular features of the target market.  We 
argue that the most effective solutions will mandate disclosure of price and quality information 
at the appropriate stakeholder levels and, simultaneously, break down provider market leverage 
where it prevents price transparency from helping consumers.  Together, these two elements 
have the potential to lower healthcare costs.  Finally, we present four possible price 
transparency initiatives that represent a range of possible alternatives, including litigation, 
legislation, regulation, and consumer driven initiatives.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the United States spent $2.7 trillion dollars on healthcare.4  National healthcare 
expenditures accounted for 17.9% of the gross domestic product and have nearly doubled since 
2000.5  In recent years, American businesses have begun to falter under the weight of providing 
affordable insurance to their employees, and the number of uninsured Americans has increased 
to over 46 million.6 The need to reduce healthcare costs is more apparent than ever and the 
Affordable Care Act has brought numerous cost-reduction initiatives to the forefront. 
In August 2012, several of the nation’s top healthcare experts who helped write the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) included “price transparency” in an eleven-point plan to reduce 
health costs.7  They argued that price transparency would permit consumers to compare available 
prices and anticipate overall costs before choosing a provider or hospital.8  In turn, publically 
accessible price information would encourage providers to offer more competitive pricing and 
                                                 
4
 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2011 HIGHLIGHTS, available at 
http://cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/ 
Downloads/highlights.pdf (last visited February 11, 2013). 
5
 Id. 
6
 ROBIN A. COHEN & MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CDC, HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 2011, at 2 (2012) 
[hereinafter 2011 NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY], available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/ 
earlyrelease/insur201206.pdf. 
7
 Ezekiel Emanuel et al., A Systemic Approach to Containing Healthcare Spending, NEJM, Aug. 1, 2012, available 
at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsb1205901.  
8
 Id. 
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thereby reduce excess healthcare spending, a view consistent with predictions of standard 
economic theory.9  
 However, whether price transparency will have this effect on the healthcare market 
remains speculative.  Those who believe price transparency alone will reduce healthcare costs 
assume that the healthcare market will respond like other industries.  Economists have long 
concluded that markets work best when consumer prices reflect the actual cost to create and 
deliver the product.10  In fact, a majority of the empirical studies on price transparency in other 
markets shows that transparency initiatives tend to lead to more consistent, lower prices.11  While 
similarities exist between healthcare and other consumer markets, some economists believe price 
transparency will not ameliorate rising healthcare costs due to unique characteristics of the 
healthcare market.12   
One major difference is that patient demand for healthcare services generally does not 
respond in the same manner as consumer demand for other goods in terms of price elasticity, 
which estimates how consumer demand changes as price changes.13  Consumers can delay 
healthcare due to cost, but once a condition becomes severe or life threatening, consumers will 
generally seek care regardless of price.  This makes the demand for certain healthcare services 
uniquely inelastic.  Price inelasticity in the healthcare market is further exacerbated by the fact 
that consumers generally learn of their healthcare costs after receiving care, making these costs 
seemingly unavoidable.  In addition, complex billing practices, secretive insurer-provider 
contracts, the sheer number of third party payers, and major quality variances in delivery of 
healthcare may mean that it will be difficult for price transparency initiatives to achieve 
economic efficiency.14 
Unfortunately, the unique characteristics of this market make analogies and predictions 
based on other markets less reliable.  Each unique quality of the healthcare market is analogous 
to another market, but no one market contains all of the special characteristics of healthcare.  
Loosely analogous to corporate managers, who make business decisions that affect the price of 
stockholders’ shares, are providers, who negotiate with insurers over covered treatments and 
procedure prices and also make recommendations that drive patient demand for the same 
procedures.  Thus, a price transparency initiative that targets consumers alone may be less 
effective than a multi-faceted one that targets decisions made at the insurer-provider level as 
well.  Similar to the automobile and airline industry, price discrimination can affect healthcare 
prices when providers charge different payers different prices for identical services, adding to the 
growing price discrepancies for healthcare within the same geographic region.15  Further, third 
party payers insulate consumers from the full price of healthcare, allowing price to play less of a 
role in treatment choice than location, physician quality, or other non-price factors.   
                                                 
9Id. at 2–4; see also CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: DOES PRICE TRANSPARENCY EFFECT MARKET EFFICIENCY? 
IMPLICATIONS OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN OTHER MARKETS FOR THE HEALTHCARE SECTOR (Apr. 29 2008) 
[hereinafter CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS].  
10
 Robert Murray, Setting Hospital Rates to Control Costs and Boost Quality: The Maryland Experience, 28 
HEALTH AFF. 1395, 1397 (2009). 
11
 CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 9. 
12
 Id. at 4–5. 
13
 Su Liu & Deborah Chollet, Price and Income Elasticity of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care 
Services: A Critical Review of the Literature—Final Report, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. (Mar. 24, 2006). 
14
 CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 5. 
15
 Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Price of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind A Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 58 
(2006). 
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Over 30 states are currently considering or pursuing legislation to increase price 
transparency.16  To date, most transparency initiatives have targeted consumers. However, 
initiatives targeting the insurers, providers, and employers may prove more effective.  This 
article analyzes the current debate about price transparency in the healthcare market and the role 
that law and policy play in the implementation of price transparency initiatives to lower the cost 
of healthcare.  The analyses herein will critique existing price transparency initiatives and 
examine ideas for new initiatives that may benefit the healthcare market today.   
Part II provides information on the healthcare market as it relates to price transparency 
and presents different potential price transparency intervention points.  Parts III, IV, and V 
examine initiatives directed at these intervention points – the consumer, insurer-provider, and the 
employer levels, respectively – in more depth.  For each intervention point, the article analyzes 
the potentially substantial legal barriers and other obstacles to price transparency.  Part VI 
examines current transparency legislative initiatives across the country – with a special focus on 
California – as well as the potential for regulation from the Health Benefit Exchanges.  Part VII 
then analyzes a range of possible price transparency initiatives aimed to effectively target each 
specific intervention point, including consumer and employer education, antitrust litigation, state 
legislation, and state agency regulation.  These potential solutions serve as a framework for 
analyzing price transparency initiatives, accounting for varying healthcare market conditions, 
differences in legislation and regulations on price transparency across the country, and the range 
of market barriers and legal hurdles discussed in each Part. 
Lastly, based on the analysis in Part VII, Part VIII recommends four possible legal, 
regulatory, and educational solutions that might be taken alone or in combination to form an 
effective price transparency initiative.  By offering several potential solutions to simultaneously 
reduce anticompetitive behavior in healthcare markets and make price and quality information 
available in a meaningful way, these proposals provide healthcare consumers a viable path 
toward fair and visible prices.17   
 
II. THE HEALTHCARE MARKET AND PRICE TRANSPARENCY 
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National Center for 
Health Statistics (NCHS), an estimated 46.3 million persons of all ages (15.1% of the United 
States population) were uninsured in 2011.18  Sixty-four percent of insured persons were covered 
by private health insurance plans – 82.1% of those persons obtained employer-based coverage, 
while 15.3% purchased their plan independently of their employers.19  
The price of healthcare goods and services carries a different meaning depending on the 
targeted party.  Whereas co-pays and monthly premiums matter most to individual consumers, 
healthcare providers are most affected by reimbursement rates paid by private and public health 
                                                 
16
 Anna D. Sinaiko & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Increased Price Transparency in Healthcare—Challenges and 
Potential Effects, 364 New Eng. J. Med. 891, 891 (2011). 
17
 While the analyses and recommendations provided herein use California as the target case study, many of the 
issues also pertain to markets in other states across the country. 
18
 ROBIN A. COHEN & MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CDC, HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 2011, at 2 (2012) 
[hereinafter 2011 NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY], available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/ 
earlyrelease/insur201206.pdf. 
19
 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT (2012), 
available at http://www.census.gov/cps/data/cpstablecreator.html. 
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insurers.  Therefore, revealing certain healthcare costs to the wrong party will not be as useful or 
as effective in lowering healthcare costs as a more appropriately targeted approach.    
Insurers, providers, employers, and individual consumers are all potential targets for price 
transparency initiatives.  Price information aimed at facilitating competition between providers 
or insurers differs from information aimed at providing guidance to consumers.  To illustrate 
these potential points of intervention for transparency initiatives, consider the following example 
of an MRI: Provider A’s gross charge for an MRI is $2,000.20  However this is not the price an 
insurer pays, or the price for which the insured consumer is responsible.  For this MRI, Provider 
A has negotiated a rate of $1,000 with Insurer X and a rate of $1,500 with Insurer Y, but Patient 
B will pay a copay of $50 with Insurer X or a 10% co-insurance of $150 with Insurer Y. 
 The effect of any particular price transparency initiative will depend significantly on the 
targeted entities, the relevant market conditions, the usefulness of the information disclosed, and 
the ability of the targeted entity to act on that information.  A well-designed price transparency 
initiative that takes into account these factors can reduce healthcare costs, while others will have 
little effect, or worse, could increase healthcare costs.  
 The following sections demonstrate different price disclosures at each of the consumer, 
insurer-provider and employer levels, and their impact.  
 
III. CONSUMER- LEVEL PRICE TRANSPARENCY 
 The goal of consumer-level price transparency is to create better-informed consumers of 
healthcare.21  The hope is that well-informed consumers will use easily accessible and 
comprehensible price and quality information to purchase lower-priced, higher-quality 
healthcare, thereby changing market demand and lowering overall prices. Consumers of 
healthcare include both individual persons and employers who purchase healthcare benefits for 
employees.  This section focuses on the individual consumer, while Part IV tackles the issues 
surrounding employer-level price transparency.  Consumer-directed price transparency initiatives 
can mandate disclosure of prices at two points: 1) individuals at the point of plan selection; and 
2) individuals at the point of provider/treatment selection.  While many existing consumer-level 
transparency initiatives target individuals, these initiatives have had only moderate levels of 
success because patients do not have access to complete price and quality information in an 
easily comprehensible and usable format.22  
Price transparency at the individual consumer level concerns the amount of payment for 
which the consumer is responsible.  For uninsured consumers, the price of care is also the same 
as the total payment to the provider.  However, for insured consumers the price they pay for care 
often represents only a small fraction of the overall cost; the insurance plan will pay for the rest, 
often at negotiated and discounted rates.  Prior to selecting a health plan, individuals typically 
receive information on the different pricing structures associated with various insurance 
companies.  Access to meaningful price and quality comparison data would enable consumers to 
carefully evaluate health plans before becoming a customer.  Historically, at the point of plan 
selection, consumers have had access to plan premiums, deductible, and coinsurance amounts. 
                                                 
20
 The gross charge for a medical procedure is the price billed to uninsured consumers.  This amount is often 
different from the actual price recovered by providers. 
21
 Id. at 894. 
22
 JH Hibbard & E Peters, Supporting Informed Consumer Health Care Decisions: Data Presentation Approaches 
That Facilitate the Use of Information in Choice, 24 ANNUAL REV. PUB. HEALTH 413 , 414–16. 
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However, as more individuals move into high deductible health plans (HDHPs), consumers will 
have to pay the actual prices of specific services out of pocket, making provider costs also 
relevant to plan selection.  Once enrolled in a health plan, consumers will require additional 
information regarding the price tiering of providers within their chosen plan, such as whether 
certain providers will require a higher level of coinsurance or copay.  Price transparency 
initiatives targeting individual consumers should offer access to provider reimbursement rates 
that, along with provider quality information, can assist consumers in plan and provider 
selection.  Unfortunately, providing meaningful price and quality information in a usable format 
for individual consumers has proven very challenging.  Attempts to do so have resulted in only 
marginal consumer uptake.23 
A. IMPLICATIONS OF CONSUMER-LEVEL PRICE TRANSPARENCY  
Economists and health policy scholars have debated the effects of transparency on the 
healthcare market for years.24  While traditional economic theory argues that access to 
meaningful information in any market will result in a decrease in product cost,25 others caution 
that, in the healthcare market, price transparency may result in unintentional effects, including 
price increases, if not implemented properly.26  This Part describes these different theoretical 
effects and considers the reasoning behind each in order to better craft an economically efficient 
initiative.  
In 2008, Congress commissioned the Congressional Research Service (CRS)  to examine 
the effect of greater price transparency on the healthcare market.27  The CRS ultimately 
concluded that greater price transparency might lead to lower prices.28  In preparing the Report, 
CRS examined several empirical studies on price transparency in other markets and several 
economists’ opinions on what these studies predict for the healthcare market.  Generally, the 
Report concluded that if the healthcare market reacts to price transparency in the same way as 
other markets, then increasing the transparency of price information available to consumers will 
improve competition and drive down prices.29  On the other hand, because of the special 
characteristics of healthcare, the Report also warns that increasing price transparency may 
increase prices in certain situations.30  
Michelle Kim, a PhD in healthcare management and economics, also uses economic 
theory to examine the effect of transparency measures on the healthcare market.31  Her 
                                                 
23
 CRS Report for Congress, supra note 9. 
24
 See, e.g., JH Hibbard, J Stockard, and M Tusler, “Does publicizing hospital performance stimulate quality 
improvement efforts?, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 2003; 22(2): 84–94 (demonstrating that the debate about transparency 
in the healthcare market goes back at least a decade). 
25
 Cutler & Dafny, supra note 36, at 894. 
26
 Id. at 894; see also Sinaiko & Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 892. 
27
 CRS Report for Congress, supra note 9. 
28
 Id. at 33–4. 
29
 CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 39 (citing Per Baltzer Overgaard, Market Transparency, 
Information Exchange and Competition, presented at the workshop on Competition Strategies and Competition Law, 
Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration, Helsinki, Oct. 14, 2003, available at 
http://mit.econ.au.dk/vip_htm/povergaard/pbohome/webpapers/transpcomphelsinki.pdf). 
30
 CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 38 (citing Morten Hviid & H. Peter Møllgaard, Univ. of 
Copenhagen, Dep’t of Econ., Countervailing Power and Price Transparency (Ctr. for Competition & Regulation, 
Working Paper CCR 01-2, 2001) (arguing when less informed buyers can observe prices negotiated by more 
informed buyers, sellers are less willing to offer lower prices to the informed buyers)). 
31
 Michelle Kim, The Effect of Hospital Price Transparency in Healthcare Markets (2011) (Ph.D. dissertation in 
Health Care Management and Economics, University of Pennsylvania). 
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dissertation focused on the clearinghouse model for transparency.  This model focuses on the 
effects of consumers who have access to a list of prices charged by different sellers in a market, 
and assumes that “informed” consumers with access to such a list will choose the lower-cost 
products, whereas “uninformed” consumers without access will purchase products in the market 
at random.32  Kim reports the effect of healthcare price transparency on (1) market share, (2) 
market efficiency, and (3) price sensitivity among medical care consumers.33  In terms of market 
share, Kim states that if more informed consumers search for the lowest priced providers, the 
market will experience a shift in consumers away from fee-for-service plans.34  However, Kim 
notes the difficulty of providing price and quality information to consumers in one central 
location, as opposed to piecemeal reporting of quality information on one website and price on 
another.35  Without quality information available in the same location as price information, Kim 
suggests that consumers will be unable to choose lower-priced providers.36  Instead, consumers 
will continue to equate cost with quality, likely causing prices to remain constant, if not 
increase.37  Kim’s results for consumer price sensitivity suggest that increased price transparency 
in a cost sharing system will lead to a reduction in healthcare expenditures, but only if it is 
possible to provide cost and quality information together so that consumers can understand the 
true value of services before receiving them.38  
At the consumer level, many empirical studies of consumer-directed transparency 
initiatives have reported little to no effect on healthcare prices.39  If these consumer-targeted 
initiatives have any hope of affecting the healthcare market, it will be essential to link quality to 
price and to present consumers with this information in a useful and easily digestible format.  
Otherwise, an initiative could have no effect—or worse, increase costs through collusion, for 
example.40   
To avoid the potential for an increase in healthcare costs, David Cutler and Leemore 
Dafny argue that disclosing more limited price information, such as average provider 
reimbursement rates instead of complete cost information, may make price cuts to certain 
insurers less detectable, collusion efforts more difficult, and prices less likely to rise.41  But, 
while the disclosure of average prices reduces price secrecy, such limited disclosures will not be 
sufficient to also affect patient healthcare decisions.  In practice, average prices can depict such 
an expansive range that consumers are often unable to draw helpful price comparisons among 
providers.  Further, limited disclosure cannot capture the many variables that affect price 
variation – including condition severity, geographic location, and quality of provider – that will 
inevitably affect price.42 
While research on the effects of price transparency often generates mixed predictions and 
unknown results, one consistent conclusion prevails: Making price information publicly 
                                                 
32
 Id. at 16. 
33
 Id. at 61–69. 
34
 Id. at 12.  
35
 Id. at 30. 
36
 Id. at 68. 
37
 Id. at 128–29. 
38
 Id. at 66.  Note that Kim’s study used charges billed and not actual out-of-pocket costs. 
39
 See, e.g., supra Part V.A.1. 
40
 See, e.g., supra Part III.A, discussing the potential for increased costs due to price transparency at the insurer-
provider level. 
41
 Cutler & Dafny, supra note 36, at 895. 
42
 The limitations of average price disclosure are discussed in more detail in Part IV.B. 
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available must be done with extreme care in order to begin to shape healthcare decision-making 
and avoid unwanted price increases. 
B. BARRIERS TO CONSUMER-LEVEL PRICE TRANSPARENCY 
Unfortunately, even well thought-out price transparency initiatives face significant 
barriers to success.  At the consumer level, trade secrets protections, contractual barriers, general 
provider resistance, the question of whether consumers will seek out available price information, 
and complex cost-shifting and complex billing practices in the healthcare market create hurdles 
to achieving price transparency that must be cleared before implementing a successful initiative.  
Trade secret protections, contractual barriers, and provider resistance will be addressed in the 
following section.  This section on consumer based-initiatives will address consumer usage, and 
complex cost-shifting and billing practices.  
1. QUESTIONABLE CONSUMER USAGE 
Even if a health policy initiative were successfully enacted, many health policy experts 
warn that consumers may not use this information in the ways previously described.43  If 
consumers will not comparison-shop for their healthcare like they do for other consumer 
products, making healthcare prices readily available to consumers will have very limited effects 
on healthcare spending.44 
 Major changes in healthcare billing practices may need to occur before transparency 
aimed at consumers can be expected to drive down the cost of healthcare.45  Uwe Reinhardt, 
Professor of Political Economy and Economics at Princeton University in the area of health 
policy, has argued that consumer-directed reforms cannot positively impact the healthcare 
industry unless hospital billing practices are reformed to allow consumers to readily understand 
how and for what services they will be charged.46  The current chaotic system of hospital pricing 
would, if made completely transparent to the public, be akin to “forcing sick and anxious people 
to shop around blindfolded for cost-effective care.”47  Because prices negotiated with hospitals 
vary more than prices negotiated with providers, regulating hospital pricing structures should be 
a priority.48  Effective consumer-directed price transparency will require translating the 
complicated language of healthcare billing into easy-to-understand information if consumers are 
expected to utilize that information in their decision-making.49  
Even if hospital prices became more user-friendly and readily available, consumers may 
not use it when making decisions about where to receive treatment and from whom.  Health 
services research demonstrates that patients are more likely to base treatment decisions on the 
experiences of friends and family members than cost.50  Further, in the absence of accessible and 
comprehensible quality information on providers, patients may inaccurately equate lower prices 
with lower quality services, defeating the purpose of price transparency.  
                                                 
43
 GAO REPORT ON PRICE TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67 (citing CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9); 
Ginsburg, supra note 73, at 211 (stating consumers will not use information they do not understand).  
44
 GAO REPORT ON PRICE TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67 (citing CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9); 
Ginsburg, supra note 73, at 211 (stating consumers will not use information they do not understand).  
45
 Reinhardt, supra note 15; see also infra Part IV.A.1. 
46
 Reinhardt, supra note 15. 
47
 Id. at 68. 
48
 Ginsburg, supra note 73, at 213 
49
 See CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM, supra note 35, at 1–2. 
50
 Anna D. Sinaiko, How Do Quality Information and Cost Affect Patient Choice of Provider in a Tiered Network 
Setting? Results from a Survey, Health Serv Res. 2011 Apr: 46(2):437–56, 451; see also Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation, National Survey on Americans as Health Care Consumers: An Update on the Role of Quality 
Information, (Menlo Park, Calif.: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2000). 
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 Ultimately, a consumer-directed initiative alone cannot change the course of healthcare 
spending.  In the right circumstances, initiatives aimed at increasing transparency of prices at the 
provider-insurer level are more likely to reduce costs.  Therefore, whether consumers become 
more informed purchasers of healthcare as a result of a price transparency initiative is not 
dispositive of the effectiveness of price transparency overall.  However, a consumer-targeted 
initiative may be a helpful piece of a larger price transparency strategy, so long as consumers are 
able to understand and effectively use price information in their decision-making processes.  
2. COMPLEX COST-SHIFTING AND BILLING PRACTICES 
Complicated healthcare billing practices also pose additional challenges to the 
implementation of effective consumer-based price transparency measures.  The complex series 
of cost-shifts in the healthcare industry—from the insurer, through multiple providers, to the 
consumer—also contributes to potential difficulties for individual consumers and employers in 
obtaining complete price information.51  For hospital procedures, both in- and out-patient 
services, the billing passes through multiple providers, e.g., the anesthesiologist, surgeon, and the 
hospital.  Provider networks can minimize some complexity, as insurers have access to in-
network prices in advance based on their contractual relationship with those providers.  But as 
soon as a patient sees one out-of-network provider in the chain, estimating costs in advance 
becomes more problematic.  
Questions of consumer usage and complex billing practices must be addressed as part of 
launching an effective consumer-based price transparency initiative.  However, before 
consumers can access the information, numerous barriers must be overcome to obtain price 
information from insurers and providers.  Each presents a formidable challenge to implementing 
effective price transparency initiatives and will be discussed in further detail in Part IV. 
IV. INSURER-PROVIDER LEVEL PRICE TRANSPARENCY 
Between insurers and providers, numerous legal and practical mechanisms prevent 
disclosure of negotiated price terms that hinder price transparency.  Currently, confidentiality 
clauses and so-called “gag clauses” in provider-insurer contracts ensure that knowledge of 
negotiated prices stay between the parties in privity of contract.52  Insurers and providers may 
also seek to protect the confidentiality of their prices as a trade secret.  Lastly, providers may 
simply resist any price transparency initiative that may compromise their bottom line.  As a 
result, third party insurers, providers and consumers are kept in the dark as to the prices being 
charged and collected.  
Using the illustration introduced above, Provider A charges Insurer X a lower rate than it 
charges Insurer Y.  However, because the contract price terms between Provider A and Insurer X 
are protected by a gag clause, Insurer Y is unable to use those price terms to negotiate a lower 
rate with Provider A.  Mandating price transparency of negotiated rates at the insurer-provider 
level may facilitate more competitive pricing by allowing Insurer Y to use its knowledge of the 
contract with Insurer X to negotiate a lower rate.  This would, in theory, drive down overall 
healthcare costs as competitors would be able to use their knowledge of these prices to increase 
their bargaining leverage and negotiate for lower prices. 
A. EFFECTS OF PRICE TRANSPARENCY AT THE INSURER-PROVIDER LEVEL 
However, theory may not always turn into practice. Unlike its conclusions on the effects 
of consumer-level price transparency, CRS warned that, because of the special characteristics of 
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healthcare, increasing price transparency might increase prices at the insurer-provider level.53  
For instance, the same report on the effects of consumer-level price transparency highlights the 
effects of price transparency on the airline industry, which, like the hospital industry, has high 
fixed costs and a non-storable product.54  After the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, increased 
competition led to lower fares for consumers and lower salaries for many employees.  The most 
valuable components of the industry, however, such as pilots and mechanics, like highly 
specialized surgeons in healthcare, did not experience a salary reduction.55  The Report 
concluded that well-designed price transparency initiatives, however, could improve efficiency, 
while permitting innovative and highly valued providers to remain highly compensated.56 
However, pilots do not have a similar ability to stimulate demand for their services in the way 
that surgeons do, which can continue to lead to higher overall costs.  
Cutler and Dafny similarly analogize to other markets in order to analyze the potential 
effects of price transparency on the healthcare market.57  Their article on increased price 
transparency looks to the Danish ready-mix concrete industry in the early 1990s, where Danish 
authorities implemented a price transparency policy against suspected anticompetitive practices 
by publishing actual invoice prices.58  Within one year from the dissemination of that 
information, average prices in the industry rose 15 to 20%.59  The most likely explanation for the 
price increase is that publishing transaction prices quickly revealed competitor price cuts, which 
made it easier for ready-mix concrete firms to avoid competition.60     
Given the varied hypotheses and dearth of actual studies, the effect of price transparency 
on the healthcare market remains largely uncertain.  It seems at least possible that some price 
transparency initiatives could lower healthcare costs in certain markets, but this may be merely 
one piece to the larger transparency puzzle.  Initiatives targeted at providing greater transparency 
between insurers and providers could, on one hand, inspire providers to raise prices to a uniform 
or near uniform level.  On the other hand, transparency at the provider-insurer level could 
empower insurers to negotiate for lower prices, which would contribute to an overall decrease in 
healthcare prices.  For a transparency initiative at the insurer-provider to have a chance to lower 
healthcare costs, it must first overcome certain legal obstacles that currently keep price data 
concealed.  
B. BARRIERS TO INSURER-PROVIDER PRICE TRANSPARENCY 
At the insurer-provider level, confidentiality clauses, or “gag clauses,” in provider-insurer 
contracts prevent consumers and competing providers from knowing negotiated provider rates.  
Second, to oppose mandated price transparency or prohibitions on gag clauses, providers and 
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insurers may also allege trade secret protection of negotiated prices to prevent disclosure of that 
information.  
 1. CONTRACTUAL BARRIERS 
Contract terms can prevent disclosure of negotiated rates to anyone outside of the 
contracting parties.61  This section addresses the barriers to price transparency created by 
confidentiality clauses, also called “gag clauses,” and most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses.  Gag 
clauses in contracts between insurance companies and providers currently constitute a significant 
barrier to third party disclosure of much of the relevant healthcare pricing information.62  These 
gag clauses between hospitals and manufacturers of healthcare devices can even keep physicians 
from knowing true price information about the technology they use every day, 63 leaving some 
providers without an incentive to contain costs by reducing unnecessary tests and treatments.64  
An MFN clause, on the other hand, is a contractual agreement that prohibits a provider from 
giving any other insurer a deeper discount than the contracting insurer.  Both gag clauses and 
MFN clauses can thwart transparency efforts and have the effect of unnecessarily raising 
consumer costs. 
a. Gag Clauses 
While some existing price transparency initiatives circumvent these contractual 
obligations by disclosing cost ranges or gross prices, such figures are not specific enough to be 
useful for consumers or employers in making purchasing decisions.  More specific price 
information, however, is often subject to “gag clauses” in contracts between insurers and 
providers that prohibit the contracting parties from disclosing the negotiated prices with third 
parties.  These gag clauses allow insurers to pay “must-have” providers, or anchor providers—
that is, essential providers to a health plan—higher than market prices for services, without other 
providers’ knowledge.65  Further, they prevent payers and consumers from knowing the 
differences in provider-negotiated rates.  Without the ability to compare prices, providers, 
payers, and consumers cannot be sure they are getting a competitive price.  Price transparency 
initiatives to eliminate gag clauses at the insurer-provider level would allow other insurers and 
providers, who are not parties to the contract, to know the prices their competitors charge or are 
being charged for specific services.   
Gag clause prohibitions can produce varied effects depending upon specific market 
dynamics.  In markets with high levels of competition, eliminating gag clauses might give 
insurers more incentives and leverage, if consumers gravitate toward low-cost, high-quality 
providers.  Under those circumstances, providers will not be able to insist on higher rates unless 
they have the cost and quality measures to support that demand.  However, this model assumes 
that, in highly competitive healthcare markets, cost and quality information is available, easily-
accessible, and that patients will use it to make healthcare decisions.  To date, no data is 
available to support this assumption.  Even worse, in markets without substantial competition, 
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transparency of prices paid to “must-have” providers may encourage other providers with as 
good or better quality measures to demand even higher prices, thereby driving up the cost of 
healthcare in those markets.   
Efforts to eliminate gag clauses that target provider and insurer behaviors can translate 
into lower or higher costs overall.  At best, providers might be forced to provide valuable, 
transparent reasons for charging higher prices, such as quality measures or being the only 
provider in a healthcare market who offers certain services, or else lower their prices to maintain 
a profitable patient base.  At worst, this might allow competing providers to demand higher 
prices, driving up costs.66  Market concentration and the negotiating power of providers must be 
addressed before price transparency can truly be effective.  But identifying this possibility, and 
the market conditions that create it, can enable policymakers to design around this concern. 
Unfortunately, successful price transparency initiatives to remove gag clauses may prove 
more elusive when aimed at affecting consumer choice.  Unlike insurers and providers who may 
have a more complete understanding of codes and healthcare pricing structures, consumers on 
the whole do not and cannot effectively use information they do not understand.67  In order for 
disclosure of insurer-provider negotiated prices and quality information to consumers to help 
lower healthcare costs, the information must be easily accessible and comprehensible, not simply 
available.68   
Just as transparency interventions aimed at the insurer-provider level may result in a 
benefit to consumers by creating lower prices, consumer-level disclosure may, in turn, affect 
providers and insurers by allowing consumers to demonstrate where their demand lies, thereby 
creating a more level playing-field for contract negotiations.  Returning to the MRI cost example 
from Part II, a price transparency initiative eliminating the gag clause in the contract between 
Provider A and Insurer X can create these mutually beneficial results.  First, Insurer Y would 
gain access to the $1,000 rate between Provider A and Insurer X.  This would give Insurer Y 
increased bargaining leverage and allow it to negotiate for a lower rate.  Second, eliminating the 
gag clause would allow individual consumers and employers to comparison shop between 
Insurer X and Insurer Y.  In choosing the insurer with the lowest reimbursement rate, Insurer X, 
consumers have the ability to increase the demand for Insurer X’s rate.  This would also give 
Insurer Y more leverage at the bargaining table to negotiate for a lower rate.  Both levels of price 
transparency, therefore, have the potential to drive down healthcare costs.      
While disposing of gag clauses may prevent secret deals and selective discounts that lead 
to escalating costs, some economists believe that price transparency at the provider-payer level 
could have the opposite effect of actually raising prices charged to patients.  Thus, thorough 
economic analysis of the effects of this type of initiative in different market settings is necessary. 
b. Most-Favored-Nation Clauses 
Most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses have also had similar effect on the healthcare 
market, stifling competition and driving up healthcare costs.69  In the healthcare market, MFN 
clauses occur most often when large insurers with substantial market power agree to pay “must-
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have” providers a higher than fair price to have them in their network.  These agreements can 
have the effect of setting a minimum price for all medical services covered by the contract.  
“Thus, the cost of such services incurred by a dominant insurer with an MFN clause can become 
the minimum price for all other competitors in the market that deal with those same providers.”70  
As a result, MFN clauses can make it impossible for new insurers to offer a competitive plan in a 
given market because of the inability to negotiate the same or lower prices with “must-have” 
providers.71   
To have a competitive advantage, an insurer must ensure that it pays the lowest price for 
important providers, not that it pays a low price. As a result, large insurers do not need to use 
their leverage to negotiate lower costs and can accommodate higher price demands from 
providers.  Any additional costs can be passed on to consumers in the form of higher premiums.  
In the healthcare market, the existence of MFN clauses in insurer-provider contracts has hindered 
alternative delivery systems and interfered with competition, causing prices to rise.72  Like 
initiatives to prevent MFN clauses, price transparency initiatives would enable large insurers to 
negotiate to obtain the lowest prices applicable to a “must-have” group of providers.  However, 
this might cause must-have providers to charge higher prices overall, rather than lowering them.  
Further, price transparency initiatives would also allow competitor providers to see the higher 
prices other providers have been able to negotiate and demand to be paid those prices as well, 
which could drive up the cost of healthcare across the board.  However, without price 
transparency, certain markets may fall prey to great insurer bargaining power.  Insurers could 
continue to offer certain providers lower rates and better camouflage costs, perpetuating arbitrary 
rates rather than rates that are competitively-driven. 
Contractual barriers, in the form of gag clauses and MFN clauses, inhibit efforts to 
increase healthcare price transparency.  These barriers exist in large part due to market 
concentration and increased provider leverage, which in turn can be used to hinder competition 
and drive up insurance premiums.73  However, at this stage, economists can only speculate as to 
the current impact of these clauses on healthcare prices and the effects of prohibiting them on the 
future of the healthcare market.  Greater economic analysis of healthcare market conditions and 
behavior must be conducted before complete price transparency can be implemented by the 
prohibition of confidentiality clauses. 
2. TRADE SECRET BARRIERS: PRICE INFORMATION AS TRADE SECRETS 
Confidentiality clauses and agreements in contracts also raise the question of whether 
healthcare prices—that is, the negotiated rates in insurer-provider/hospital contracts—are trade 
secrets, such that insurers could defend against the mandatory disclosure of a price transparency 
initiative.   
Trade secret law is determined on a state-by-state basis.  To date, 46 states have adopted 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).74  The UTSA was intended to codify section 757 of the 
                                                 
70
 James F. Doherty & Monique Ras, Most Favored Nation Clauses in Payor/Provider Agreements, at 3, available 
at http://www.insurance.ohio.gov/documents/MFN6.pdf. 
71
 Cutler & Dafny, supra note 36, at 894. 
72
 Id. at 895. 
73
 See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations – The Fork in the Road, 364 NEW ENG. J. OF 
MED.  E1, E2 (2011); Thomas L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations – A New Thing with Some Old 
Problems, 3 HEALTH L. OUTLOOK, 6, 9 (2010).  
74
 James H. Pooley et al., § 1.2 in Overview of California Trade Secrets Law, in Trade Secrets Practice in California 
, CEB ONLAW (2d ed. 2011). States that have not adopted the UTSA rely on common law based on the Restatement 
of Torts. 
2013] CLARIFYING COSTS  14 
 
First Restatement of Torts,75 which defines a trade secret as including “not simply information as 
to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the business . . . [but] a process or device for 
continuous use in the operation of the business.”  At common law under Section 757, the 
“continuous use” requirement effectively excludes ephemeral events, such as specific sales price 
information, from protection.  The UTSA, however, eliminated the continuous use requirement.  
This change, arguably, may broaden the definition of what kinds of information can be afforded 
trade secret protection, so as to include pricing information.76  The inclusion of price 
information, however, ultimately remains uncertain in the healthcare market because it has yet to 
be resolved by the courts. 
The threshold question in trade secret law must be whether the information is a trade 
secret.  Usually the answer is determined when the holder of an alleged trade secret files a 
misappropriation claim, alleging that someone or some entity has used or disclosed their trade 
secret information through improper means.77  If the information is determined to be a trade 
secret, that information is protected only against misappropriation.  If no trade secret exists, an 
alleged misappropriator is not liable under the state’s UTSA, even if the information was 
improperly acquired.   
 In terms of possible healthcare price transparency mandates, the analysis will not focus 
on whether price information has been misappropriated; before such mandates are in place, no 
misappropriation can occur.  Rather, this analysis must preempt a misappropriation claim and 
examine whether a transparency initiative can force insurers and providers to disclose their 
pricing information without running afoul of their legal ability to protect their alleged trade 
secrets.  This will depend upon whether pricing information meets the definition of a trade 
secret.   
 3. DEFINING PRICE INFORMATION AS A TRADE SECRET 
The 1984  Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as follows: 
‘Trade secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that: (1) 
Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to the public or to other person who can obtain economic 
value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.78   
Whether information is a trade secret is a question of fact;79 the court will objectively determine 
whether a trade secret exists.  A party’s belief that information is secret or contractually 
confidential may be a factor in the analysis, but is not dispositive.80   
 a. First Prong – Unknown information with economic value 
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The first prong of the USTA definition is more easily understood when broken down into 
two separate elements: (a) information not generally known, and (b) independent economic 
value.  Each will be discussed separately, followed by the final definitional prong of “secrecy 
measures,” effectively creating a three-part test. 
(a) Information not generally known.  First, the information claimed to be a trade secret 
must  not be generally known or readily ascertainable by business competitors or others to whom 
the information would have some economic value.81  A party alleging misappropriation of trade 
secrets must initially be able to identify the trade secrets with “reasonable particularity” prior to 
discovery.82  This flexible standard requires the party to identify the alleged trade secret in a fair, 
proper, just and rational manner under all circumstances so that the trial court can control the 
scope of discovery and allow both parties the opportunity to prepare their case.83  In certain 
cases, a court may require the party claiming trade secret protection to “separate [the instant 
subject matter] from matters of general knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge to those 
persons who are skilled in the trade.”84  A court will often require a party to draw this distinction 
when the nature of the alleged trade secret makes a detailed description, alone, inadequate to 
allow the opposing party to learn the limits of the trade secret and to develop defenses, or to 
allow the court to effectively control the scope of discovery.85  
(b) Independent economic value. The second element of the first prong requires that the 
information derive value from the fact that it is a secret.  The value of the information to a 
competitor must be substantial; it is insufficient to know that it might have been merely helpful.86  
To determine what value is substantial, it is necessary to compare the alleged secret information 
to information generally known.87  This requirement was codified from the common law 
requirement that a trade secret reflect a “competitive advantage,”88 which is especially helpful to 
insurers and providers wishing to keep their negotiated pricing confidential so as to maintain a 
competitive advantage against the rest of the market participants.  The focus, therefore, is on the 
greater value of the alleged secret information in comparison to information of general 
knowledge.  Any unrelated value or the value of efforts expended to create the information is not 
conclusive evidence of substantial value, although both are relevant to the analysis.89 
b. Second Prong – Secrecy measures 
The second prong of the test requires the party alleging secrecy of information to show 
that they have made reasonable efforts to keep the information secret.  To satisfy this prong, the 
party must show that its secrecy efforts make it difficult for a third party to acquire the 
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information, except by improper means.90  Such efforts include, among others, imposing an 
obligation of confidentiality, such as a confidentiality clause in a contract, to prevent others from 
sharing the information.  Conversely, information easily obtainable, sold on the open market, or 
discovered by reverse engineering cannot constitute a trade secret.91 
 (1) The effect of the Restatement’s and the USTA’s definition on the courts 
Due to the rather amorphous definition provided by the USTA for trade secrets, many 
courts have referred back to the First Restatement to help narrow what kinds of information can 
receive trade secret status in other markets. Courts that have decided cases related to commercial 
transactions and business investments have still invoked the “continuous use” requirement to 
exclude ephemeral information and align the definition of trade secrets with the legislative intent 
of the UTSA.92  One federal district court in New York concluded that although a company had 
taken all the necessary measures to maintain the secrecy of its pricing information, prices 
fluctuate over time in any market and cannot receive trade secret protection.93  However, since 
New York has not adopted a version of the UTSA, but only the common law definition of trade 
secret from Section 757 of the Restatement of Torts,94 this case may inform, but is not binding as 
to interpretation of trade secret law in states that have adopted the USTA.  Courts in USTA 
jurisdictions may nonetheless find the New York district court’s ruling to be persuasive authority 
in future cases of first impression. 
Courts may also deny trade secret designation if the information has been disclosed even 
to a limited set of individuals.  Therefore, price disclosures to customers on an individual basis 
have been found to evade trade secret protection because of the theory that disclosure would not 
necessarily end with the individual consumer, but could continue to be disseminated by that 
consumer to other third parties.95  These courts reason that once the consumer has possession of 
allegedly confidential information, the seller’s competitor can easily obtain that information from 
the consumer.96  This case law seems to suggest that proponents of price transparency could 
successfully defend against trade secret claims if so much as one line of price data was made 
available to an individual consumer.  In particular, the fact that Aetna has made complete price 
information available to its members on its website may be enough to withstand a trade secret 
defense asserted by the insurance company.97 
 (2) Pricing in healthcare: unanswered by the courts 
Two federal district court cases in Minnesota and Pennsylvania attempted to tackle the 
question of whether healthcare pricing can be protected as a trade secret.  In each case, Aspen 
Healthcare Metrics (Aspen) and Emergency Care Research Institute (ECRI), respectively, urged 
the court to find that the prices hospitals pay for implantable medical devices manufactured by 
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Guidant Corporation do not qualify as trade secrets as a matter of law.98  In opposition, Guidant 
asserted trade secret protections for the “prices paid by hospitals to Guidant for its devices.”99  
Each court denied motions for summary judgment, ruling that a genuine issue of material fact 
remained as to whether Guidant’s pricing information met the above three-step analysis.100  
Ultimately, both cases settled on confidential terms before trial, leaving the merits of Guidant’s 
trade secret claims unexamined.     
Consequently, the proprietary nature of pricing information in the healthcare context 
remains unresolved.  As for the first prong of the trade secret analysis, healthcare pricing 
information remains unknown and arguably has substantial independent economic value such 
that politicians, policymakers, and economists alike have long been advocating for increased 
price transparency in the healthcare market.  However, these cases may serve to strengthen the 
second prong of the trade secret test.  The confidential nature of the settlement agreements may 
serve as further evidence of the companies’ substantial measures to maintain the concealment of 
their prices, weighing in favor of affording them trade secret protection.  
 (3) Acquiring price information from government agencies 
If a state, through legislation or regulation, mandates disclosure or invites voluntary 
disclosure of pricing information to a government agency, such as its state exchange under the 
ACA, the state government’s ability to share that information with competitor-insurers/providers 
or the public at large in light of trade secret protections is unknown.  In some instances, a 
company may disclose information to a third party while still maintaining secrecy of the 
information through contract, such as a gag clause.  When the third party is a government 
agency, however, the analysis becomes more complicated. 
In California, for example, intentional disclosure of proprietary pricing information by a 
state agency is governed by the California Public Records Act (CPRA).101  The CPRA provides 
that public records are open to inspection by members of the public, unless exempted by law, and 
must be made promptly available upon request.102  The law allows individuals to bring actions to 
enforce disclosure of information if they feel it has been wrongfully withheld.103  A public record 
includes any writing retained by any state or local agency, regardless of physical form or 
characteristics.104  “This definition is intended to cover every conceivable kind of record that is 
involved in the governmental process and will pertain to any new form of record-keeping 
instrument as it is developed.”105  As a result, if the state or local government has negotiated with 
providers for discounted rates on healthcare services, those contracts may be obtainable via 
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CPRA.  Further, if California passes legislation or regulation that mandates disclosure of 
healthcare price information to a government entity, individuals may be able to enforce 
disclosure of that information which may, in turn, negate a trade secret claim by the owner of 
that information.  
Some exemptions to CPRA do exist.  While no statutory exemption directly applies to 
information disclosed pursuant to a state transparency initiative, three kinds of exemptions may 
apply to healthcare pricing information as well as to trade secrets -  §6254(q) exemptions, the 
“trade secret exemption,” and the “catchall exemption.” Each could be used by insurers and 
providers wishing to maintain the secrecy of their individual prices.  
Section 6254(q) exempts, in part, negotiations with providers of healthcare services by 
special negotiators who represent the State Medi-Cal program.  It also exempts portions of a 
provider contract with Medi-Cal containing rates of payment for three years from the date of the 
contract.  This and all other exemptions must be narrowly construed.106  Since no such 
exemption exists for private insurer negotiations or contract provisions with providers, it seems 
unlikely that private insurance companies and providers could successfully challenge disclosure 
of pricing information should it be lawfully retained by the state through a transparency 
initiative.  Furthermore, even if individuals sought to challenge disclosure of information by a 
government agency, CPRA would not allow them to bring actions to prevent the disclosure.  
However, the government may appear hypocritical if its agencies collected and disseminated 
data from private insurance companies, while still maintaining the secrecy of its own healthcare 
price information. 
The trade secret exemption prevents disclosure of all trade secrets under CPRA if their 
disclosure “is exempt or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law including…the Evidence 
Code relating to privilege.”107 Although the exemption references only the Evidence Code as 
basis for trade secret protection, it has been interpreted to incorporate by reference all statutory 
and common law bases for the protection of trade secrets, including the UTSA.108  Thus, the 
analysis returns to the original inquiry to determine whether the information qualifies as a trade 
secret. 
The catchall exemption protects confidential information if “the public interest served by 
not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure.”109  Private 
insurers could contend that the risk of healthcare price increases posed by price transparency is 
high enough that disclosure of healthcare price information does not serve the public’s interest.  
While reputable data and analysis exist about the possible negative outcomes of price 
transparency, without more conclusive studies in the healthcare market this argument is unlikely 
to meet the onerous burden of clearly outweighing the benefit of disclosure.  Further, recent case 
law suggests that it is becoming increasingly difficult to protect proprietary information under 
the catchall exemption.110  
Finally, local city ordinances may provide additional regulations pertaining to disclosure 
of proprietary information.  San Francisco’s Sunshine Ordinance, established by Chapter 67 of 
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the San Francisco Administrative Code, is the city’s version of the CPRA.111  Under the 
Sunshine Ordinance, the Director of Public Health may withhold proposed and final payment 
rates for managed care contracts for its employees.112  However, just like the CPRA, this 
exemption, narrowly interpreted, does not extend to private health insurance contracts with 
providers and hospitals. 
The potential for insurers or providers to claim that the specific prices negotiated in their 
contracts constitute trade secrets could be a substantial barrier to price transparency initiatives.  
In general, the courts have left substantial uncertainty as to whether healthcare prices deserve 
trade secret protection.113  However, in California, the exemptions to CPRA should support an 
argument against offering trade secret protections to healthcare price information.114  Further, 
private entity negotiations under Section 6254(q), combined with a showing that, on balance, 
public disclosure of healthcare prices weighs in the public’s interest under the catch-all 
exemption, seem to suggest that those entities seeking trade secret protection will have an uphill 
battle.115  If California courts affirmatively denied trade secret protection to healthcare price 
information, such a decision could serve to clarify muddied precedents in other states as well.  
4. PROVIDER RESISTANCE 
In addition to legal barriers created by gag clauses and trade secrets claims, provider 
resistance may create a substantial barrier to improving the transparency of healthcare prices at 
the provider-insurer level.  Even if the contractual and trade secrets issues were eliminated, 
provider leverage and resistance have the capacity to render price transparency initiatives 
ineffective and therefore should be readily addressed in any price transparency initiative.  
Providers may resist price transparency initiatives mandating public reporting and anti-
transparency clauses in their contracts.116  For instance, Aetna’s online description of its price 
transparency initiative cites “provider resistance as limiting the extent to which they can make 
price information available to their members.”117  This resistance to transparency is logical, if 
physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis.118  In a fee-for-service system without 
transparency, physicians are financially incentivized to order increasing numbers of tests and 
procedures because most consumers have no way of knowing the costs or the relative benefit of 
the procedure.  In a value-based purchasing system, which the ACA hopes to achieve, price 
transparency can actually help improve quality of care while lowering costs.  For example, 
providing greater reimbursements for physicians who provide increased preventative care and 
follow-up visits after certain procedures can shift provider incentives away from quantity of care 
and toward keeping patients well and out of the doctor’s office.119       
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Not all providers oppose price transparency. Some have spoken out in favor of it.  In 
written comments prepared for the August 25, 2012 California Health Benefit Exchange Board 
Meeting, insurers, provider groups, and other healthcare advocacy groups who partner with 
providers expressed their support for the exchange staff’s recommendation to prohibit anti-
transparency clauses (gag clauses) in insurer-provider contracts.120  Their support for 
transparency incorporated all of the above-mentioned intended effects, including cost-savings 
and creating well-informed consumers as a way to drive consumerism and lower prices. 
Although price transparency has seen some support from provider groups, in most instances, 
those seeking to advance a price transparency initiative should be prepared for resistance from 
providers. 
 
V. EMPLOYER-LEVEL PRICE TRANSPARENCY 
Employers represent a third target group for potential price transparency initiatives aimed 
at decreasing healthcare spending.  At a time when employers are facing a number of long-term 
challenges, such as controlling costs, improving employee engagement and accountability, and 
determining how to comply with new healthcare reform legislation, price transparency initiatives 
targeting employers that either purchase health insurance or healthcare services directly from 
providers have great potential to reduce overall healthcare costs.121   
Employers become consumers of healthcare when they contract with insurers to offer 
health plans to employees.  If employers could obtain both quality information on the providers 
included in a health plan as well as the negotiated prices, they could begin to use their leverage 
as purchasers to demand higher value plans and avoid plans that pay inflated rates to certain 
providers.  Knowledge of insurer-negotiated prices will also enable self-insured employers to 
demand lower prices and develop networks of high value providers.  Employers, especially large, 
self-insured employers, are in a better position to accumulate and analyze price and quality data 
than individual consumers and they also have the ability to leverage their employees’ purchasing 
power to negotiate price.  Further, groups of like-minded employers, like the Leap Frog Group or 
The Pacific Business Group on Health, may have an even greater ability to leverage their 
position to insist on higher value plans.122  More so than individual consumers, or even insurers 
and providers, employers are uniquely situated to have a game-changing impact on the way price 
transparency can affect the healthcare system.   
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A. EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE  
Employer-sponsored health insurance is the leading source of health insurance in the 
United States, covering about 149 million persons under age 65.123  Employer-sponsored health 
insurance premiums have continued to rise in recent years, rising three and four percent for 
individuals and families, respectively, from 2011 to 2012 alone.124  One factor that contributes to 
increasing cost is continued demand for plans with broad healthcare networks for their 
employees.  In the 1990s, managed care organizations with narrow provider networks received 
immense backlash due to the public perception that the narrow networks amounted to indirect 
healthcare rationing.125  Employers consequently began to demand broader provider networks 
from health plans to satisfy employee desire for greater provider options.126  This demand gave 
providers significant bargaining leverage to negotiate higher payments from insurers, and even 
greater leverage for certain “must-have” providers,127 especially hospitals, while leaving other 
providers, with less influence, to accept lower payments in comparison.128  
Since the economic recession began in 2008, employers have increasingly shifted a larger 
amount of the growing healthcare costs onto employees in the form of high deductible health 
plans (HDHPs).129  In both the individual and employer markets, HDHPs are the latest trend in 
health insurance, frequently accompanied by either a health savings account or reimbursement 
arrangement.130   HDHPs require consumers to pay out-of-pocket for healthcare services up to a 
certain threshold, e.g. $10,000, before the health plan will begin to cover a portion of healthcare 
costs like a traditional PPO plan.  HDHPs thus trade lower monthly premiums for higher 
deductibles, in an effort to reduce the moral hazard that typically accompanies insurance.131   
Enrollment in HDHPs has grown rapidly over the last five years.  Based on data from 
2011, 52.4% of persons with a private plan, directly purchased or obtained through means other 
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than employment, were enrolled in an HDHP, up from 39.2% in 2007.132  Employers, too, have 
discovered HDHPs as a cost-saving solution to the rapidly rising cost of insuring employees, 
with 26.9% of individuals with employer-based coverage enrolled in an HDHP in 2011, up from 
15.6% in 2007.133  This shift to HDHPs means that insured individuals are, arguably for the first 
time, incentivized to pay more attention to the price and quality of healthcare.   Unfortunately, 
unlike the rapid growth of HDHP enrollment, the availability of price information to consumers 
has not grown with equal speed.134  However there is a wide literature suggesting that insured 
consumers, no matter how much of their healthcare bill they are required to pay upfront, simply 
will not use additional price information to change the way they shop for healthcare.135  As a 
result, recent price transparency initiatives often target consumers, but initiatives focused on 
other entities including employers, providers, and insurers may prove more effective. 
B. BARRIERS TO EMPLOYER-LEVEL PRICE TRANSPARENCY 
Each of the barriers that hinder price transparency at the individual consumer and insurer-
provider levels also prohibits employers from obtaining transparency price and quality 
information to aid them in choosing higher quality, more cost-effective health plans for their 
employees. 
First, legal barriers, such as gag clauses and trade secrets protections, will similarly 
prevent employers from demanding pricing information that will enable them to select low-cost, 
high-quality health plans.  If employers are unable to compare health plans based on both price 
and quality, it will prove very difficult to convince their employees that a switch to smaller 
provider networks is in their best interests. Further, efforts to maintain the secrecy of contract 
terms also minimizes the need for providers to compete for employer-sponsored plan purchasing. 
Second, questionable consumer usage may prevent employers from demanding smaller 
network insurance plans with lower costs and higher quality.  Employers will need their 
employees to be engaged participants in order for them to make such a great sea change in their 
purchasing habits.   
Third, provider resistance to price transparency prevents competition in the healthcare 
market, which, in turn, can prevent employers from effectively comparing the cost and quality of 
health plans.  Lack of provider competition operates as a disincentive to reveal pricing to 
purchasers of healthcare.   
VI. CURRENT TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVES 
Not dissuaded by the significant barriers to price transparency, state governments, private 
insurers, and independent private entities have initiated programs relating to price transparency 
and the disclosure of healthcare charges.136  This Part examines these existing initiatives to 
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improve disclosure, transparency, and reporting of provider charges and fees. In recent years, 
California has enacted a range of programs aimed at improving access to healthcare information 
for consumers. This Part will first examine California’s combination of efforts, and then examine 
the initiatives of other states, a private insurer, and independent private entities. 
A. CALIFORNIA LAWS AND CURRENT TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVES 
California currently has four separate transparency initiatives pertaining to healthcare 
cost, quality or both. Each current initiative has the potential to target all three levels of price 
transparency – insurers, providers, and consumers.  First, this section evaluates the Payers’ Bill 
of Rights, which requires unwaivable, mandated reporting by California hospitals of prices for 
certain procedures.137  Second is an assessment of California Hospital Compare, a website that 
gathers data via voluntary reporting of quality measures.138  Third, this section provides an 
overview of California legislation aimed at increasing price transparency in the healthcare 
market: SB 751 allows insurers to disclose price and quality information to their members,139  SB 
1196 allows healthcare claims data to be disclosed to qualified entities.140  
1. PAYERS’ BILL OF RIGHTS 
Sections 1339.50-56 of the California Health & Safety Code, also known as the Payers’ 
Bill of Rights, seeks to prevent hospitals from “gouging patients” and to help inform patients of 
the cost of healthcare procedures. 141  It requires each hospital to disclose their average billed 
charges for the twenty-five most common inpatient and outpatient procedures to the Office of 
Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD).142  OSHPD then publishes these charges 
to its website, while hospitals must make the list of procedures and charges available to any 
person upon request.143  Any person who believes a hospital is in violation of the Payers’ Bill of 
Rights may file a claim with the California Department of Public Health (CDPH), which 
investigates such claims to determine whether a violation has occurred.144 
The Payers’ Bill of Rights also requires hospitals to make its chargemaster, a list of the 
hospital’s gross billed charges, for the specific services or items publicly available.145  
Chargemaster prices are important because they are prices billed regardless of a patient’s 
insurance coverage and are the starting point for discounted prices by insurers.146  While a step in 
the direction of price transparency, the chargemaster amounts can represent more than double the 
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actual prices insurance companies pay for the listed services and, therefore, bear little 
relationship to the actual cost of the healthcare services provided to the insured consumer.147  
So far, the Payers’ Bill of Rights has had little to no observable effect on hospital pricing.  
Several factors contribute to its ineffectiveness.  First, each hospital is allowed to determine 
which twenty-five outpatient procedures to report to OSHPD, making comparisons between 
hospitals’ list of charges not always possible.148  Second, because insured patients do not pay the 
prices listed, these prices are not likely to be helpful to the average insured consumer who is 
insulated from gross charges via their health insurance plan.149  For example, if the average price 
for a hospital stay varies significantly between two hospitals, but the out-of-pocket costs to a 
consumer are the same, access to the average price information on a chargemaster is unlikely to 
influence a consumer’s decision in favor of a lower cost provider and may even signal the higher 
priced provider as offering higher quality services.  Consumers in high deductible health plans 
(HDHPs) or with a plan that requires coinsurance payments will, however, benefit from knowing 
what their provider is charging their insurer, because that, in turn, will determine their out-of-
pocket costs.  Knowledge of these price figures could allow these consumers to determine 
whether their insurer is paying more for a particular service from one provider to another, thus 
giving consumers the capability to provider-shop within their network before even making an 
appointment.  Further, the chargemaster prices are not specific to particular health plans, which 
may be of no help at all to insured consumers who are only concerned with the price of a service 
as it relates to their plan.  Since the total number of insured individuals is expected to rise 
dramatically in 2014 when coverage on the health benefit exchanges takes effect, it will become 
increasingly important for price transparency initiatives to convey price information based on 
health plan.  
Third, OSHPD’s website does not provide an adequate explanation of chargemaster 
prices to allow the average consumer to decipher the meanings of the listed gross figures.  
Instead, the website includes vague disclaimers stating that charges will vary significantly from 
one patient to the next.  These disclaimers tend to negate the transparency initiative altogether 
since the website has no mechanism for disclosing more consumer-specific prices.  The website 
simultaneously highlights the industry’s complex billing practices by disclaiming the 
discrepancies between each patient’s cost of care.  More successful price transparency initiatives 
provide supplemental information for consumers to consider along with price when making 
decisions about a hospital.150  Aetna’s website, for example, provides a more helpful disclaimer 
to educate consumers that high quality and low price are not mutually exclusive measures.151 
Lastly, comparable quality data is completely absent from the information presented via 
the chargemaster.  The inclusion of quality data would give the listed prices the necessary 
context to be meaningful information for consumers.152  The website does provide volume data, 
which could be helpful if paired with quality and price data, allowing consumers to choose 
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physicians based on the number of times they have performed a procedure.  However, this data 
alone is not as useful, and is unlikely to have much effect on consumer choice.153 
2. CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL COMPARE 
A second transparency initiative is California Hospital Compare, a website launched by 
the California Healthcare Foundation, in partnership with the University of California, San 
Francisco, and the California Hospitals Assessment and Reporting Taskforce (CHART) to 
compare hospital quality information.154  This website includes ratings for clinical care, patient 
safety, and patient experience for over 230 hospitals that voluntarily self-report quality measures 
related to the most common procedures.  Conversely to OSHPD’s website, the quality data 
presented on CalHospitalCompare.org are not linked to price data. The website provides a link 
where individuals can go to the OSHPD site to see average pricing data, but without a 
connection drawn between the two, consumers are likely to find it too challenging to 
successfully integrate the available cost and quality information for effective use in healthcare 
decision-making.155 
3. ENACTED AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO AVOID CONTRACTUAL BARRIERS TO 
TRANSPARENCY 
In addition to requiring providers to make price and quality information available, the 
California Legislature recently addressed the problem of gag clauses in provider-insurer 
contracts by passing two laws that promote healthcare price transparency—Senate Bills (SB) 751 
and 1196.  Both laws amend section 1367 of the California Health and Safety Code to prohibit 
contract provisions that would restrict the transparency of healthcare data, also known as “gag 
clauses.” SB 751, effective January 1, 2012, targets transparency at the consumer level by 
allowing price and quality information to be made available to enrollees of health plans.156  SB 
1196, effective since January 1, 2013, pertains to the disclosure of claims data to qualified 
entities.157 
SB 751 renders void and unenforceable any contract between an insurer and a licensed 
hospital or healthcare facility that contains a gag clause.158    
A contract issued, amended, renewed, or delivered on or after January 1, 
2012, by or on behalf of a healthcare service plan and a licensed hospital or 
any other licensed health care facility owned by a licensed hospital to provide 
inpatient hospital services or ambulatory care services to subscribers and 
enrollees of the plan shall not contain any provision that restricts the ability of 
the health care service plan to furnish information to subscribers or enrollees 
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of the plan concerning the cost range of procedures at the hospital or facility 
or the quality of services performed by the hospital or facility.159   
The law does not require insurers to disclose this information; it merely removes any contractual 
barriers that may prevent insurers from doing so.160  For example, when previously hospitals 
would demand confidentiality clauses in insurer contracts, preventing health plans from 
disclosing prices paid to those providers to their members, hospitals can no longer prevent those 
health plans from choosing to make provider price information available to consumers on their 
plans. Although not explicitly stated in the statutory language, SB 751 does not prevent an 
insurer from using its discretion to refuse to disclose cost range and quality information to 
subscribers.  Thus, the law does not mandate price transparency, but merely removes a 
contractual barrier to achieving it, should insurers choose to do so.  
Two significant limitations of SB 751 are as follows: (1) The law allows only a cost 
range to be disclosed, and (2) the timing of the intervention by disclosing cost and quality 
information only to subscribers or enrollees of a health plan limits the potential effects of 
transparency.   
First, by prohibiting contractual barriers to disclosure of the range of costs to consumers, 
the legislature has created a similar problem to the Payers’ Bill of Rights—that a potentially 
large range of prices for one procedure may provide little, if any, guidance to consumers 
attempting to select a hospital.  Whether this information will help consumers make more 
informed decisions will depend on how narrow the cost ranges are.  Disclosure of a larger range 
of prices for each facility will restrict consumers’ ability to make comparisons, whereas a smaller 
range of prices may allow for better comparison of facilities.  Further, this bill received 
substantial opposition from the University of California (UC), the state’s fourth largest 
healthcare delivery system, in its letter to the Assembly Health Committee Chair opposing SB 
751.  In its letter, UC stated that the bill’s lack of built-in “means or assurances that consumers 
will receive meaningful and relevant information on provider cost and quality” prevents 
consumers from receiving the most valuable and accurate information in order to make informed 
healthcare choices.161   While SB 751 requires insurers to include several risk adjustment factors 
along with any quality measures they choose to disclose to their members, SB 751 mandates no 
such risk adjustment factors in conjunction with price information to ensure maximum consumer 
usability of quality information.  Without certain risk adjustment factors, such as severity of 
condition and type of facility (i.e. community hospital or academic medical center), consumers 
may be unable to draw meaningful comparisons across hospitals and providers.162   
The second limitation of SB 751 stems from the elimination of gag clauses as they relate 
to the disclosure of information to health plan “subscribers and enrollees” only, instead of to 
consumers prior to choosing a health plan.163  By only preventing anti-transparency clauses from 
precluding disclosure to enrollees and subscribers, SB 751 limits the potential for transparency to 
lower healthcare costs.  SB 751 does not bar contracts from preventing disclosure of price and 
quality measures to non-enrollees; insurers and providers may still keep this information secret 
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from uninsured consumers, preventing consumers from comparing hospital price ranges on 
different health plans prior to enrollment.  If the law required disclosure of price and quality 
information to consumers prior to enrollment, both providers and insurers could be forced to 
compete for business at an earlier stage, thus potentially driving down prices not just for one 
insurer, but across multiple carriers.  Still, these effects depend on whether the healthcare market 
reacts to price transparency like a traditional economic market. 
One positive effect of SB 751 is that it may provide a defense to a trade secrets claim by 
providers and insurers who wish to challenge any mandated disclosure of price information.  The 
interplay between the California UTSA and SB 751 has not yet been addressed by the courts.  
The question remains as to whether cost range information furnished to subscribers of a health 
plan under SB 751would make actual prices that insurers pay to healthcare facilities matters of 
general knowledge, or whether cost range information is so different from the actual facilities’ 
prices that those prices can still be considered “special knowledge” under the California UTSA.  
Providers could argue that disclosure of cost range information is so broad ( i.e. does not reveal 
the actual prices of procedures) that actual price information remains secretive and should 
receive trade secret status.  However, the possibility that actual price information could be 
obtained from the disclosed cost ranges by reverse engineering could cause a trade secret claim 
to fail.   
SB 1196 appears to take SB 751 one step further.  Although the law pertains solely to 
price information, it expands the disclosure of healthcare prices beyond just enrollees of health 
plans to the public.  The law prohibits contracts between a health plan and a provider, including a 
provider of supplies, from containing any provision that prohibits, conditions, or in any way 
restricts the disclosure of claims data related to healthcare services provided to enrollees, 
insureds, or beneficiaries of any self-funded health coverage arrangement to “qualified entities” 
as determined by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 164  The Secretary of 
CMS recognizes qualified entities to make evaluations of provider/supplier performance and to 
agree to meet specific requirements regarding the transparency of their methods and their use and 
protection of data.   
 To be certified as a qualified entity, an organization—“either a single public or private 
entity, or a lead entity and its contractors”—must submit to CMS an application package that 
includes information demonstrating that the applicant will satisfy the requirements specified in 
42 CFR § 401G (401.700–.721), as well as other criteria determined by CMS.165  Among other 
requirements, applicants must demonstrate existing expertise and sustained experience (defined 
as three or more years) in performance measurement, the ability to combine Medicare data with 
existing claims data, a process for allowing providers to review and correct their performance 
reports, and adherence to rigorous data privacy and security procedures.166  If it demonstrated 
sufficient expertise, an exchange could apply to be a qualified entity; alternatively, a group of 
healthcare stakeholders organized as a single entity, as required by section 401.703(a), could 
perform the same function.  Once determined to be qualified, a multi-stakeholder organization 
that represented a range of interests in healthcare could collect price data and determine the best 
                                                 
164
 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1367.50 (defining a “qualified entity,” pursuant to 42 USC 1395kk, as a public or 
private entity “that is qualified (as determined by the Secretary) to use claims data to evaluate the performance of 
providers of services and suppliers on measures of quality, efficiency, effectiveness, and resource use”). 
165
 Id. 
166
 42 CFR § 401.700-.721; Qualified Entity Certification Program for Medicare Data, 
https://www.qemedicaredata.org/SitePages/about.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (stating that applications will be 
accepted on a rolling basis). 
2013] CLARIFYING COSTS  28 
 
way—in the interest of all stakeholders—to use that information.  Such an organization could 
potentially partner with California's Health Exchange, Covered California, to inform its 
decisions. 
B. OTHER STATE INITIATIVES 
In other states, some current transparency initiatives provide access to complete cost 
information, while others use only limited price data. Complete cost information is the disclosure 
of a price that incorporates all discounts, includes associated costs such as lab fees, and identifies 
out-of-pocket costs.167 Complete cost information allows patients to anticipate all potential costs 
they could be responsible for when undergoing a particular procedure. On the other hand, limited 
price data or price averages enhance the risk that consumers will feel misled by the information 
or not use the information at all.168   
While complete cost information can be extremely difficult to obtain due to confidential 
agreements between insurers and providers, two price transparency initiatives – one public and 
one private – demonstrate that providing complete cost information is potentially attainable.  
However, whether transparency will affect consumer decision-making or provider-insurer 
negotiations will depend on successful implementation.   
The first example is the public initiative of the state of New Hampshire: HealthCost. 
Since 2007, HealthCost has disseminated complete medical cost information by insurance plan 
and procedure, as well as prices for uninsured consumers.169  Directed at individual consumers 
and employers, the website lists specific prices that reflect negotiated discounts and other 
reductions from the billed charges obtained through claims data.170  Insured users enter their 
insurance plan, their deductible amount, and their percentage rate of co-insurance, and the 
website uses that data to calculate their out-of-pocket costs as well as the total cost of the service 
by provider. The website is updated quarterly to reflect the most recent changes in pricing.  
However, New Hampshire does not provide quality data as a part of its price transparency 
initiative.  This leaves consumers unable to truly compare providers and leaves open the question 
of whether higher prices reflect higher quality care. 
Other states have not gone as far in their price transparency initiatives.  The 
Massachusetts initiative, MyHealthCareOptions, provides a median and range of insurers’ 
aggregated payments made to particular provider groups and hospitals based on claims data.171 
While Massachusetts, like New Hampshire, has access to claims data that could be used to 
provide complete cost transparency to its consumers, it instead provides average prices paid by 
private insurers for specific services.  This is due, in part, to insurers’ and providers’ concerns 
about the initiative disclosing insurer-specific information to consumers, as well as a lack of 
technical capabilities to identify which hospital and physician data should be linked.172  
Consumers, therefore, cannot see a price estimate that is specific to their insurer, much less their 
specific health insurance plan or their specific treatment.  
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1. PRIVATE INSURER 
Similar to New Hampshire’s HealthCost, Aetna’s “Member Payment Estimator” provides 
complete cost information to members through access to the insurer’s negotiated discounts with 
providers.173  Prices for each service are provided as “service bundles.”  This means that when a 
member searches for the price of a cesarean section, the generated price includes the costs likely 
to go along with that procedure, e.g. anesthesia and blood work, giving members a more 
complete picture of the cost.174  For calculating estimated out-of-pocket costs, Aetna links 
member data to its price transparency website, which then automatically updates and calculates 
the member’s estimated costs in real-time.175  Aetna’s transparency initiative also provides 
consumer education that high price does not always mean high quality, and informs consumers 
that low cost/high quality healthcare does exist.176  However Aetna’s member-only access to 
complete cost information precludes employers and individual consumers from accessing the 
Member Payment Estimator until they have already committed to the health plan.  Further, 
member-only access still prevents other insurers and providers from accessing these figures, 
which does not facilitate competition among health plans. 
2. INDEPENDENT PRIVATE INITIATIVES 
Finally, there exist three private, web-based initiatives that are not affiliated with a 
specific insurance plan.  The first of these is Clear Health Costs, a company that gathers data 
from independent reporting, including from health-care providers, participating consumers, and 
other databases, to bring transparency to consumers in the healthcare market.177  The goal of this 
website is to “empower[] consumers to make informed decisions about costs of their medical 
care and coverage.”178  The website currently focuses on common procedures and items in the 
New York City and San Francisco areas, and provides Medicare pricing information for these 
procedures in all other states.179  Within the two focus areas, the website provides the highest and 
lowest cash prices for uninsured consumers per procedure charged by specific providers, in 
addition to varying price reports from the company’s various reporting sources.180   
Another private transparency initiative has been launched by Compass Professional 
Health Services (“Compass”).  Compass provides healthcare pricing information to employers 
and individual consumers who pay an annual membership fee.181  In addition to consumer 
advocacy and helping consumers and employers to find low-cost, high-quality healthcare, 
Compass’s website also contains a blog and news reports on the latest changes in the healthcare 
industry, as well as several white papers directed at helping consumers select the best health 
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plans and save money.182  For uninsured consumers who are trying to save money on healthcare 
costs, Compass does not seem to be the best cost-saving solution.  However for employers, a few 
hundred dollars per year in membership fees may be worth the 25% savings proposed by 
Compass’s services.183 
A third private transparency initiative is Castlight Health.  Since 2008, this San Francisco 
company has been offering an online portal that allows self-insured employers to provide quality 
assessment and price transparency information to employees.184  Castlight Health also has 
partnered with health plans to help deliver cost and quality information directly to plan members, 
including individuals and small businesses, with the belief that enabling consumers to make 
better-informed decisions when purchasing healthcare will drive quality up and costs down.  
While there are no consolidated results of Castlight’s efforts on their website, the multitude of 
positive testimonials suggests that Castlight has successfully enabled employers, employees and 
individual consumers to realize significant savings.185  
C. EXISTING INITIATIVE EFFECTIVENESS 
Each of the state and private initiatives targeting individual consumers discussed above 
provide helpful information to consumers, but none provides all the necessary components for 
what potentially could be the most effective consumer-targeted transparency.  For price 
transparency to be most effective, complete cost information must give customers an accurate 
and actionable picture of their healthcare costs.186 While the Massachusetts Connector is unable 
to provide complete costs, both the Aetna and New Hampshire initiatives have demonstrated that 
this level of disclosure is possible.  Bare pricing information, however, like that of New 
Hampshire’s initiative, without providing more explanation and context, may have the effect of 
misleading consumers into believing that higher price is always indicative of better quality 
care.187  Ideally, transparency of healthcare prices alongside quality measures would 
meaningfully assist consumers, and those making decisions on their behalf (employers, health 
carriers, and referring practitioners) in making more informed healthcare decisions.188  Judith 
Hibbard, a health policy professor and researcher, argues that consumers will not use information 
they do not understand because of unwillingness to go through the process of trying to make 
sense of the information and match it up with other factors, such as quality, provider or peer 
recommendations, and location.189  The most effective transparency initiative, Hibbard asserts, 
will reduce the mass of information into an index that consumers can easily understand.  Only 
then can consumer choice have a large enough impact on the healthcare market to actually lower 
costs.   
Theoretically, a more informed consumer population choosing higher-quality and lower-
cost healthcare services could force providers and hospitals to not only charge competitive prices 
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for healthcare services, but could also provide an incentive to increase quality of care.  Aetna’s 
website is an example of this contextual transparency with cost and quality available in concert.  
However, Aetna’s transparency falls short of its full potential by limiting disclosure of that 
information to its members only.  Further, all of these initiatives target the consumer-level only. 
At a time when employees and employers have so much more at stake than before, employer-
education initiatives like Castlight will also be an integral part of ensuring effective price 
transparency.   
While state government and private insurers have yet to launch a price transparency 
initiative that is proven to lower healthcare costs, each of the three independent private 
organizations have sought to fill the regulatory gap and offer employers and individual 
healthcare consumers valuable information to help them lower their healthcare costs.   
 
VII. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO PROMOTE EFFECTIVE PRICE TRANSPARENCY 
As demonstrated above, price transparency initiatives can be implemented through a 
variety of methods. This Part examines a range of potential legal and educational initiatives 
designed to promote price transparency. The legal solutions include antitrust litigation, 
legislative solutions, and exchange regulations.  Next, this Part will explore possible educational 
initiatives for employers and consumers to promote price transparency. Part VIII will then offer 
recommendations for combinations of potential solutions. 
A. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS 
One possible solution is for states to continue to try to promote price transparency 
through legislation. Price transparency legislation will have varied effects, depending upon 
particular conditions in the target market.  In urban areas with a higher concentration of 
providers, less leverage, and greater market competition, price transparency may drive price 
decreases, while rural areas with fewer providers may actually see healthcare prices increase.  
The potential for geographically varied outcomes results from provider leverage over certain 
markets, where more leverage exists for “must-have” providers and providers supplying unique 
services within a network.190  As a result, blanket price transparency requirements should not be 
implemented through legislation.  Instead, the legislature should focus on incentivizing price 
transparency in areas with less leverage and greater competition where its intended effects are 
most probable.  With this in mind, there are three potential avenues for legislating price 
transparency.  
 First, a state legislature could pass legislation that gives the state the authority to certify 
individual health plans that provide the best value, both within and outside of the exchanges, as 
“Visible Value” plans.  Exchanges could require Visible Value plans to meet specified criteria 
for lower cost and high quality services. Receiving certification would also signal to consumers 
that the plan did not result from any anticompetitive tactics such as MFN clauses or geographic 
tying leverage, and that it has value-based financial incentives for provider payment, rather than 
fee-for-service.  Since complete transparency may not be an ideal solution for all markets, the 
law should require that insurers only disclose complete price information negotiated with 
providers to the exchange or other state agency in charge of certification in order to determine 
certification eligibility.  By not releasing full price information to competitors, this will prevent 
collusion in less competitive markets while still allowing the state to direct consumers to those 
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health plans that offer the best quality care for the most competitive price, in the absence of 
anticompetitive negotiations.  
In terms of transparency to the public, only certified Visible Value plans would be 
required to make provider quality scores and premium rates available to the public.  Each 
certified health plan would be required to maintain quality and cost scores at a minimum level, or 
else lose its certification status.  In addition to facilitating consumers’ healthcare decision-
making, this legislative transparency initiative may also incentivize providers to deliver higher 
quality care and insurers to negotiate for lower priced, better quality providers, thereby helping 
to lower the cost of healthcare statewide.  
 One challenge of this approach would be gathering and analyzing the cost and quality 
data needed to certify the health plans. In California, the cost portion of this data could be 
collected by a qualified entity, designated by CMS to gather and disseminate data on provider 
performance pursuant to SB 1196,191 and evaluated in accordance with the legislative criteria to 
determine which plans are eligible for certification.192  A state could apply to CMS for 
designation as a qualified entity for purposes of gathering price and quality data.  Other entities, 
such as a multi-stakeholder group, could also apply for qualified entity status to enable collection 
of this information for Visible Value plans.  The quality evaluation, however, would either 
require voluntary reporting by health plans, or would need to be collected from a quality 
comparison website, such as California Hospital Compare193 or “Health In Sight,” a national 
hospital rankings website.194 
This process of certifying best-value health plans would differ from the tiered health 
plans in that tiering is fundamentally based on cost, whereas this certification will be based 
additionally on quality and competitive activity.  Because the success of health plan certification 
depends on consumer engagement and purchasing of those certified plans, education programs 
for individual consumers and employers will be absolutely necessary.  Similar to the types of 
consumer education found on Aetna’s website regarding provider cost and quality,195 succinct 
and usable information must be provided to consumers and employers to ensure full 
understanding of the certification process.196   
 States could also pass legislation requiring an annual review of all insurance premium 
increases of 5% or greater.  Currently, the Affordable Care Act mandates an annual review of 
premium rate increases of 10% or more.197  By mandating an even more strict review, states 
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could monitor rising costs more closely.  States could deny and assess penalties on insurance 
companies that are unable to justify their rate increase by demonstrating quality improvements or 
increased benefits.  If triggered, annual review of premium increases of 5% or greater could also 
nullify gag clauses, as insurers would be required by law to disclose information negotiated in 
provider contracts in order to justify their desired increase.  Penalties and mandatory disclosures 
would provide strong additional incentives for insurance plans to keep premium increases below 
5%.  These mandatory disclosures for auditing purposes would not be disseminated to the public; 
however, the information may be requested under a state’s public records law, such as the 
CPRA, to facilitate public disclosure. 
B. REGULATORY SOLUTIONS 
Unlike legislation, which is created by an internal proposal from within a legislative 
body, voted on by both the houses and then signed by the governor, regulation can be created by 
any state agency with the power to enforce certain laws.  While the most opportune regulations 
could come from the exchanges, initiatives can also be implemented outside of the exchanges by 
state departments of insurance. 
Recent healthcare reform efforts create new opportunities to address the gap in consumer 
information through the state health benefit exchanges.  The ACA requires states to pass 
legislation to legally set up an exchange, or else the federal government will administer one for 
them.198  The federal law gives states flexibility to set up exchanges in ways that will most 
benefit each state, within certain federal guidelines.  The creation of state exchanges offers two 
opportunities for states to incorporate price transparency initiatives into these new entities: 1) 
legislation establishing the exchanges; or 2) regulations created by an exchange to govern 
qualified health plans offered on the Exchange. As the first state-created exchange, this section 
will use California as a model for analyzing price transparency initiatives at the exchange level. 
1. LEGISLATION GOVERNING THE EXCHANGE 
In January 2011, California became the first state to create a health benefit exchange with 
the passage of Senate Bill (SB) 900 and Assembly Bill (AB) 1602. SB 900 established the 
Exchange and created a five-member Board of Directors. AB 1602, the California ACA, creates 
the structural framework of the California Health Benefit Exchange, known as Covered 
California.  The statute grants the Board the authority to determine both the minimum 
requirements for carriers to offer a plan on Covered California, as well as the standards and 
criteria required for designating a plan as a Qualified Health Plan (QHP) eligible to be offered 
through Covered California.  Most notably, section 2(a) calls for the creation of a “transparent 
marketplace for Californians to purchase affordable, quality healthcare coverage.”  Incorporating 
transparency language into the legislation establishing Covered California opens the door to 
discussion about ways to implement a price transparency initiative in California, with hopes to 
pave the way for other states to follow suit. 
2. AVENUES TO EXCHANGE REGULATION AND THEIR UNCERTAINTIES  
Since California enacted legislation designating Covered California as an active 
purchaser, it had the authority to impose requirements, such as price transparency, on health 
plans that wish to be a part of the exchange.  As one of its first steps to actively negotiate with 
health plans, the Board drafted a list of requirements and questions for plans submitting bids to 
be on the exchange.199  Covered California asked bidders to describe their current costs, quality, 
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and efficiency programs, including “activities to identify for members/consumers those providers  
. . . that are more efficient and/or lower cost” and “the web-based cost information that the Plan 
makes available.”200  Each bidding health plan must also reveal current cost containment 
strategies, describe methodology used to combine provider cost and quality metrics,201 and list 
any contractual agreements with its participating providers that prevent it from making contract 
terms transparent to plan members.202  Based on bidders’ responses, the Board has the authority 
to fine-tune its requirements and impose even greater restrictions on insurers. 203   
The Board does not currently impose any price transparency requirement on health plans 
that wish to participate in Covered California.  However, increased pressure through stakeholder 
testimony and written comments at meetings and in webinars may motivate the Board to 
mandate price transparency on the exchange.  The Board strongly believes that its efforts should 
be guided by input from stakeholder groups.204  As a result, it invites public testimony and 
submission of written comments at its meetings, allows stakeholders to give panel presentations 
on particular issues, and holds separate webinars to assess stakeholder values and concerns.  This 
willingness to listen to and incorporate stakeholder feedback provides an opportunity to advocate 
for incorporation of transparency initiatives within the exchange.  
While additional price transparency initiatives are unlikely to be incorporated into 
existing contracts for plans that initially want to participate in Covered California, those 
initiatives could be incorporated at a later date.  At this stage, the Board appears to have 
considerable authority to impose requirements on health plans to shape the operation of the 
exchange.205  The Board did include certain reporting requirements for plans that want to 
participate in Covered California, but so far they largely focus on quality reporting.206  The 
Board should also consider similar reporting requirements for healthcare service, device, and 
procedure prices. However, Blue Shield of California wrote in comments to the Board that while 
it would favor a prohibition of anti-transparency clauses, it was too late to amend or change their 
contracts with providers for Qualified Health Plans, as bids were due to the exchange in January 
2013.207  If the Board is reluctant to add requirements to the initial plans, once fully established, 
Covered California or the California Department of Insurance, which regulates insurance 
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practices within the state, could impose additional regulations to promote price transparency on 
plans offered within Covered California.  
The commitment to transparency in AB 1602, along with Covered California’s position 
as an active purchaser, places it in an influential position to shape the ways health plans and 
insurance companies disclose price information to consumers on the exchange and to hold 
insurers accountable for meeting those requirements.  But as it stands, the Board has not utilized 
its full authority to promote price transparency on the exchange. Evaluating current transparency 
initiatives employed by plans seeking inclusion in Covered California should be just the first 
step.  To ensure consumers on the exchange have access to meaningful price and quality 
information in order to make educated decisions about plan selection, the Board will need to use 
its regulatory power to require transparency of complete cost information, like the New 
Hampshire and Aetna initiatives have suggested.  If key stakeholders can communicate to the 
Board the importance of such initiatives, it may be feasible for the Board to incorporate them 
into Covered California in the near future.  Requiring price and quality reporting as part of health 
plan certification on Covered California has the potential to improve consumer decision-making 
and spur competition in the healthcare market. 
Furthermore, state exchanges may have a role to play in promoting competition and 
constraining the use of provider leverage to drive up costs, which in turn could promote price 
transparency. As ACOs move from being offered as part of the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program (MSSP) into the private market, the “biggest obstacle” to the ability of ACOs to obtain 
the triple aim of (1) better care for individuals; (2) better health for populations; and (3) slower 
growth in costs through improvements in care,208 is “provider market power.”209 In many ways, 
the introduction of ACOs into the private market “asks the private sector to respond responsibly 
to changes that are rife with possibilities for opportunistic behavior.”210 The vertical and 
horizontal integration of providers required to create an ACO will offer even more opportunities 
to collude on prices and obscure pricing information.   “Must have” hospitals and dominant 
physician specialty groups that have been able to command higher reimbursement rates from 
private insurers are unlikely to volunteer to change the way the way they practice medicine in 
ways that would limit their profit margins, rather they are more likely to seek out ACO 
opportunities that will further entrench and expand their market power.211  
In anticipation of these potential risks, CMS enlisted the cooperation of the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to establish some guidelines for 
walking the delicate line between encouraging ACO market entry and deterring potential 
anticompetitive effects. The Final Statement issued by the FTC and DOJ articulates the general 
antitrust enforcement policies the agencies will apply to ACOs including  “safety zones” for 
market concentration levels within common service areas, and rule of reason analysis for joint 
negotiations with private payers, rather than strict scrutiny.212 But many feel that these 
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regulations do not go far enough.213 All in all, the Final Statement represents a relaxation of 
antitrust standards for ACOs, but as Thomas Greaney has pointed out in particular detail, of 
greater concern are the significant regulatory options to avoid anticompetitive behaviors that the 
federal government has not taken.214  
Specifically, in the Final Statement, CMS, FTC, and DOJ decided to remove a condition 
from the Proposed Statement that would have required that all ACOs seeking certification from 
CMS undergo mandatory antitrust review prior to certification for participation in the MSSP.215 
Such a provision would have discouraged the creation of ACOs with structural components that 
created opportunities for anticompetitive behaviors, and also given the antitrust agencies 
additional bargaining leverage in dealing with ACOs engaging in anticompetitive conduct.216 
The federal agencies’ bypass of stricter antitrust review and enforcement offers an opportunity 
for regulation at the state level, and particularly by the exchanges, to guard against further 
entrenchment of provider market power that drives price occlusion and increased health care 
costs. 
3. REGULATORY RECOMMENDATIONS 
State regulation can take many forms.  First, the largest mandate a state could require 
would be to mandate price transparency of all plans offered by any insurer, regardless of whether 
the plan is offered on the exchange.  Second, the exchange, through its contracting power as an 
active purchaser, could implement a certification process for health plans that meet more 
rigorous cost and quality measures.  For these certified Visible Value plans, an exchange could 
mandate disclosure of complete price transparency, including negotiated prices to providers, by 
insurers to the exchange only, while allowing the exchange to publish quality and premium 
information to the public.  This type of selective price transparency would serve to protect 
against over-disclosure of price information that may have unintended consequences, such as 
collusion, which could raise prices. 
A similar model of this type of certification exists currently on the Connector, the 
healthcare benefit exchange in Massachusetts.  The Connector screens each carrier based on a 
high standard of quality and rates each on a scale of one to four stars consistent with the National 
Committee for Quality Assurance.217  One report reviewing the Connector cautions that 
exchanges must strike the right balance between setting the bar too low and not effecting any 
change, and imposing too many requirements and running the risk of “be[ing] unable to attract a 
sufficient mix of the plans that consumers want.”218 
Additionally, an exchange board might consider creating various sub-portals within the 
exchange based on geographic market.  A similar division of healthcare markets could also be 
implemented by a state Department of Insurance, which may be more equipped to determine 
which geographic regions would respond most positively to consumer-driven competition.219  By 
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actively dividing the state into regional healthcare markets, the governing body can then choose 
which regions would respond best to certain transparency initiatives and only implement them in 
those areas.  Currently, the California State Legislature has proposed such a division to partition 
the state into thirteen healthcare regions.220  Likewise, California’s Insurance Commissioner, 
Dave Jones, has proposed an 18-region plan, arguing that an increased number of regions will 
lower possible premium increases due to the differing cost of healthcare among communities.221 
Finally, exchange boards may wish to set up a portal to track which parts of the exchange 
website consumers visit and what they consider when choosing insurers and providers.  If a 
board creates a price transparency initiative and wishes to track consumer traffic on its website, it 
should partner with healthcare economists in order to begin generating data on how healthcare 
consumers respond to certain initiatives in order to continue to fine-tune them.   
Although the effects of regulations and statutes, so long as they are not conflicting, are 
similar,222 regulations serve to fast-track the above initiatives.  While a board can only impact 
those health plans offered on the exchange, by implementing these initiatives through regulations 
both the board and the Department of Insurance can begin annual reviews and certifications more 
immediately, instead of waiting out the long and potentially futile legislative process. 
C. EMPLOYER AND CONSUMER EDUCATION INITIATIVES 
On the other hand, legal and regulatory actions are not the only potential paths. A silver 
lining to our country’s recession and its effect on the healthcare market is that now is likely the 
most opportune time, on many levels, to implement price transparency initiatives.  With 
employers increasingly shifting more healthcare costs onto their employees via high deductible 
health plans (HDHPs), and employees’ salaries unable to keep up with the growth rate of 
healthcare, consumers have more incentives to be cost-conscious when purchasing healthcare 
products and services than ever before.  With consumers paying closer attention to healthcare 
prices, and providers, in turn, taking notice of consumer healthcare trends,223 both employers and 
consumers are poised to be target audiences for price transparency initiatives. 
1. CONSUMER-LEVEL INITIATIVES 
Targeting consumers directly with price transparency initiatives will be harder and may 
prove least effective of all possible avenues in lowering healthcare prices overall.  Pricing 
information varies from consumer to consumer based on insurance carrier, type of health plan, 
and geographic location. Further, not all price information will be relevant to all consumers.  
This means that effecting change on a consumer level will require disclosing price information 
on a variety of levels to incorporate all the necessary variables to influence enough consumers to 
make a difference in healthcare spending.  Creating and designing an initiative that would allow 
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consumers to retrieve specified price information based on several variables would cost more 
than simply mandating that providers disclose their negotiated reimbursement rates.  It would 
require gathering those rates for each provider and insurer contract, as well as quality measures 
from each provider, and distilling that information into streamlined figures that can be 
manipulated through an Internet portal to compare such variables by insurer, health plan, 
location, and budget. 
The next step in disclosing healthcare costs to consumers is ensuring usability of that 
information.  As they currently exist, hospital billing codes, methods of healthcare service 
bundling, and the various levels of cost-shifting (from numerous providers, to insurers, to 
employers) make comprehension of healthcare pricing extremely difficult for the average 
consumer.224  But given the trend of enrollment in HDHPs, a growing number of consumers are 
poised to start paying more attention to healthcare expenditures.  Although there is still no 
guarantee consumers will use available cost and quality information when purchasing health 
insurance or choosing a provider, there are certain ways of presenting more meaningful cost 
information that will serve to educate consumers.  Also, a younger generation of healthcare 
consumers may be more familiar with and willing to use these kinds of online tools to evaluate 
health plan and provider options.   
For any generation, the more meaningful transparency information is to consumers, the 
more likely it is to influence their healthcare decision-making.  Separate disclosure of price and 
quality information, as is typical, is too fragmented to be useful for consumers.225  Rather, 
presenting cost and quality information either in a side-by-side comparison or a separate scale 
that is easy to understand may inspire healthcare consumers to act more like consumers in other 
markets, resulting in lower overall healthcare costs.226   
One solution to promoting usability of transparency information is to develop a website 
that enables consumers to enter their health plan, medical condition, and geographic location to 
generate a list of available providers and their prices and quality scores.  This initiative would 
require higher start-up costs than other price transparency measures.  For instance, it would 
likely require the development of software to convert thousands of healthcare products and 
services, at thousands of facilities, into one state-wide scale of measurement.  This initiative, 
however, is a prime example of a model that may qualify for demonstration grant funding under 
the ACA, which could alleviate state implementation costs.227  If consumers begin to use this 
information in large numbers to choose lower cost providers, which remains a significant 
question, they could reduce provider leverage and healthcare costs overall.  
2. EMPLOYER-LEVEL INITIATIVES 
Higher spending for hospital, physician, and other clinical services accounted for over 80 
percent of premium increases between 2005 and 2009.228  As it stands, employer demand for 
broad provider networks gives providers substantial leverage to contract for higher prices with 
insurers in order to participate in their network. In a market with substantial provider leverage for 
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“must-have providers”, transparency initiatives could cause insurers to pay more for all provider 
groups, if they reveal that they pay higher prices to dominant providers.229  Once exposed, it is 
more likely that other providers will also demand higher prices, rather than the “must-have 
provider” reducing their prices. Insurers can regain leverage by convincing employers to shift 
their preferences to narrower, but high quality, networks.  With provider payment and quality 
information transparent to employers, employers would then have the tools and knowledge to 
demand plans that offer particular low-cost, high-quality providers.  This would allow employers 
to save money on healthcare benefits and, at the same time, to offer employees greater value 
healthcare.   
Narrow and tiered networks have already gained some traction in the small group market, 
especially when combined with consumer-driven health plans, such as HDHPs.230 For example, 
in Indianapolis, where consumer-driven health plan enrollment is high, health plans focus on 
helping employers see the benefits of choosing those plans that incorporate lower-cost, high-
quality services, thereby narrowing the network of providers needed on a given health plan.231  
By educating employers about the value of certain providers, insurers are not only saving money 
themselves, but they also help employers save money on healthcare costs and provide better 
value care for their employees.  Unfortunately, this strategy has been circumvented by the 
manipulation of billing codes, whereby providers attempt to convolute insurers’ ability to 
determine which facilities provide lower-cost services.232  To thwart this potential barrier it will 
be necessary, as mentioned in Section IV.C.3, to demystify billing codes for employers as well 
as individual consumers.   
Consumer-driven plans not only incentivize individual consumers to stay healthy, but 
also change the nature of the healthcare market.  In theory, consumers enrolled in HDHPs will 
pay closer attention to the cost of their day-to-day healthcare than those on traditional health 
plans with copays.  Since enrollees of consumer-driven health plans have incentives to be cost-
conscious consumers, efforts to introduce employer-level transparency and to educate both 
employers and consumer would allow employers to choose health plans with smaller networks of 
high-quality, lower-cost providers and communicate those better value plans to their employees.  
This employer-based strategy will prove most effective at reducing healthcare costs in 
geographic markets with a wide range of choices among physicians and hospitals, because it will 
increase transparency and, therefore, competition among providers to be recognized as lower-
cost, high-quality providers that employers should want to direct their employees toward.  This 
type of initiative will prove less effective in markets with provider monopolies or few 
competitors. 
Shifting the leverage from providers to employers (and individual consumers) may also 
yield particularly beneficial results in the self-insured employer arena.  In order to educate 
employers about the potential cost-saving power of a price transparency initiative, it is likely that 
human resources departments, insurance brokers, and private companies, like Castlight Health 
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will need to play a role in helping employers understand their options.233  For instance, Castlight 
creates an online space where employees of self-insured employers can shop for healthcare based 
on price, quality and how much of their deductible is already spent.  By educating employers 
about how to, in turn, educate their employees, data gathered by Castlight demonstrates that 
helping self-insured employers aid their employees in informed healthcare decision-making can 
change employee behavior.234  As the main purchasers of healthcare, employers should exercise 
some leverage of their own.  If large companies demanded price transparency, whether through 
an intermediary such as Castlight or on their own, providers who once were able to leverage 
higher prices against blind employers would either need to produce evidence of value or else 
accept lower payments.   
To realize this change, self-insured employers may negotiate lower prices in exchange for 
incentivizing employees to use the provider, as Lowe’s Company has done with the Cleveland 
Clinic.235  The North Carolina-based company encourages its employees from all across the 
country to travel to the Cleveland Clinic for high quality heart procedures at comparatively low 
prices.236  Because of the size of Lowe’s employee base, the arrangement was beneficial enough 
for Lowe’s that it agreed to pay for all travel and lodging costs for employee-patients and a 
companion, as well as waive a $500 deductible, among other out-of-pocket costs.237  Through 
employer initiative and innovation, Lowe’s is able to offer better quality healthcare to its 
employees at a lower cost.  If more self-insured employers can demand services, compare the 
cost and quality of healthcare nationwide, and incentivize employees to seek out recommended 
providers, not only may employers realize savings, but individual consumers may also see the 
effects of transparency on their costs as well.  For example, it may be difficult for providers to 
continue demanding higher payments for individual consumers when their prices and quality 
information, now transparent to employer-consumers, suggest services are worth less. 
D. ANTITRUST SOLUTIONS 
As discussed above, dominant providers and insurers can use their market power as 
leverage to drive up healthcare prices and conceal the increases from employers and consumers. 
While antitrust regulation offers a potential path to address anticompetitive behaviors going 
forward, antitrust litigation offers a way to break down existing market power by protecting 
consumers—not competitors—from anticompetitive actions in the marketplace.238  Because the 
healthcare market is rife with market inefficiencies,239 dominant parties in healthcare are 
especially able to leverage their market power and thereby make wealth distributions even more 
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lopsided, which contributes to the high price variation between hospitals.240  In combination with 
price transparency and antitrust legislation or regulation governing health care providers, an 
antitrust suit can help force dominant parties to reveal their competitive prices by making market 
conditions more responsive to changes in consumer demand.  This section will analyze three 
potential avenues for bringing an antitrust suit to promote price transparency. 
1. CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS BETWEEN PROVIDERS AND PAYERS 
The Sherman Act is the primary vehicle for U.S. antitrust enforcement.241  Section One of 
the Sherman Act prohibits multiple parties from engaging in a “contract, combination, or 
conspiracy” that constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade.242  To prove a Section One 
violation, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a multi-party agreement243 and that the 
agreement is an unreasonable restraint.244   
Certain contract provisions between providers and insurers may constitute unlawful 
contracts under Section One.  Most notably, most favored nation (“MFN”) clauses that guarantee 
insurers they are receiving a provider’s best rates—a form of payment parity agreement—open 
the door for antitrust liability by limiting the prices that providers can charge to other insurers.  
MFN clauses can harm competition by locking in payment levels, thwarting innovation, and 
preventing price competition.245  In addition, agreeing to an MFN clause causes providers to lose 
any incentive to offer lower prices, because they must offer the same low price to all insurers, 
which results in an increased equilibrium price throughout the market.246   
MFN challenges are commonly brought against dominant insurers, as in the case of the 
Department of Justice’s challenge to Blue Cross Blue Shield in Michigan, which dominates the 
Michigan insurance market with anywhere from 40% to 80% market share across different 
geographic areas.247 Establishing liability under this theory would require evidence that insurers 
have used MFN clauses to force providers to charge competing insurers higher rates, thereby 
unreasonably restraining trade.  Despite the anticompetitive harms caused by the enforcement of 
MFN clauses, however, it is unclear what the impact of such a suit would be on price 
transparency.  Furthermore, the strongest MFN suit would challenge dominant insurers, but the 
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economic literature suggests that dominant providers are more of a problem in keeping prices 
hidden from consumers.248  Breaking down dominant insurers’ market power may also make 
them less powerful negotiators to challenge these providers.  Thus, while such a lawsuit might 
have some success in breaking down entrenched market power, it may not be the best route to 
achieve price transparency. 
2. TYING ARRANGEMENTS 
Another theory of antitrust liability under Section One is unlawful tying, which occurs 
when a company uses its market power in one product to coerce the purchase of a second, 
separate product.249  To prove a tie, there must be (1) two separate products involved, (2) a tie 
requiring the purchase of the tied product as a condition of buying the tying product, (3) 
sufficient market power in the tying product to make the coercion possible, and (4) a not 
insubstantial effect on interstate commerce in the tied product’s market.250  A party is harmed by 
and therefore has standing to challenge an illegal tying arrangement if it is either a purchaser 
forced to buy the tied product or a competitor prevented from competing in the tied product’s 
market as a result of the illegal tie.251  
a. Unbundling Services 
One potentially unlawful tie in the healthcare market is hospitals’ bundling of services in 
their negotiations with payers, which effectively masks the prices of individual services.  
Litigation would address hospitals’ conditioning of insurers’ purchase of services in which they 
have market power (the tying product) on the purchase of distinct, non-dominant services (the 
tied product).  For instance, if a hospital offered the only neurosurgery department in a 
metropolitan area, it could require an insurer to pay a single high price for all services provided 
at the hospital in order to include the hospital’s neurosurgery services in its network.  Forcing the 
separation of those services that are not functionally related will reveal the discrete values of 
each service, thus enabling insurers to negotiate for the true value of each service and therefore 
set more efficient prices for consumers.  For consumers willing to accept narrower networks, this 
would allow for the creation of health plans that offer greater value for cost.252  This theory of 
tying, however, might face difficulty in court due to the perceived and actual benefits of 
bundling services,253 but with careful analysis of the impact on consumers, the availability of 
alternatives, and the ease of entry into the market, appropriately tailored antitrust litigation could 
help break apart distinct services. A price transparency initiative could then provide consumers 
with accurate information about those services. 
b. Breaking Geographic Ties 
A second possible incidence of unlawful tying exists in the practice of dominant hospital 
networks abusing their market power in one geographic market (the tying product) to coerce 
insurers to purchase their services in other geographic locations (the tied product).  Insurers have 
highlighted this concern, pointing to provider networks that span several geographic markets and 
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insist health plans contract with them on an “all-or-nothing” basis,254 thereby allowing providers 
to increase rates and impose non-price requirements that prevent cost-containment and 
transparency.255  To date, a claim of geographic tying has not been alleged and therefore would 
have to overcome many legal hurdles, but because of the tendency of these ties to harm 
competition, courts may be willing to apply antitrust liability to this conduct under a theory of 
tying. 
Most notably, of the four elements of an unlawful tie, proving the existence of two 
separate products will be difficult.  Patient demand for services in distinct geographic regions 
may demonstrate that two hospitals in one network satisfy the separate products test,256 but the 
case law is unclear as to whether an unlawful tie can exist where the two products are part of the 
same network but in different geographic markets.257   Although this argument aligns with the 
general justifications for prohibiting tying,258 a court may be unwilling to distinguish between 
separate products offered by a single hospital network that operates as a single company and 
negotiates on a broad geographic scale.  Furthermore, establishing the second element, the 
existence of a coercive tie, requires proof that the tie coerced the insurer to purchase the tied 
product; that is, if the insurer might have contracted with the hospital in the tied market 
notwithstanding the tie—the difference being only the amount it paid—there might be a strong 
argument against the establishment of antitrust liability.259  Finally, the last two elements of the 
claim—market power and foreclosure of a substantial amount of competition—both require 
intensive economic analysis, including analysis of market share and barriers to entry in the 
primary market, as well as procompetitive and anticompetitive effects in the secondary 
market.260  If these elements can be proven, challenging these geographic ties has the potential to 
break up market power and force providers to negotiate rates separately for their services in each 
geographic region.   
When paired with price transparency, breaking these ties should enable insurers to 
negotiate competitive rates and, in turn, allow employers and consumers to engage more fully 
with the healthcare marketplace.  Specifically, if hospital networks are forced to negotiate rates 
that reflect the products they are offering in the immediate geographic region—without the 
added leverage of a distant must-have provider—they should no longer be able to maintain 
anticompetitive, artificially high rates after the ties are broken.  In geographic regions where 
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hospital networks lack leverage in the form of must-have providers, the public release of price 
and quality information would give insurers and consumers sufficient information to arrive at 
efficient market solutions in rate negotiations and purchasing decisions, respectively.  Thus, a 
price transparency mandate that follows successful geographic-tie-breaking antitrust litigation 
could be highly beneficial to consumers, at least in certain regions.  In regions where networks 
include must-have providers, however, those networks would likely maintain their market power 
and ability to maintain high prices.  There, a price transparency mandate could result in a parallel 
price increase across providers who would now have full access to the rates their competitors 
were receiving, allowing them to raise their rates to the same level.261  Consequently, even if 
antitrust litigation is successful in breaking apart geographic ties, the benefits of any price 
transparency regulation targeted at regions with the added leverage of a must-have provider must 
be carefully weighed against the potential of causing other providers to increase their prices.  
3. ANTITRUST OVERVIEW AND REQUISITE FACT-GATHERING 
Any of these options will first require gathering facts about the markets, competition, and 
contracts at issue.  Important evidence to gather will include: contract terms that might constitute 
unreasonable restraints; the impact of contract provisions on competition; accurate measures of 
market power; economic analysis of product and geographic markets; and measures of the 
impact on competition caused by the alleged unlawful agreements. 
In considering whether litigation would be worthwhile, it is also important to consider 
whether the remedy will be simply an injunction or treble damages and what the deterrent effect 
of that remedy would be, both on the specific entity against whom the case were brought and as a 
more general deterrent.  To change widespread behavior, antitrust enforcement is costly and 
uncertain, but simply targeting a small number of dominant parties would demonstrate the state’s 
willingness to challenge anticompetitive behavior and discourage other provider organizations 
from abusing market leverage.   
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The most effective combinations of these solutions will include two elements: (1) one 
that targets provider leverage by discouraging anticompetitive behavior, and (2) another that 
mandates disclosure of price information.  For instance, breaking apart geographic markets, 
alone, risks only reforming healthcare pricing in the select areas where geographic ties exist.  On 
the other hand, merely requiring price transparency may have the unwanted result of driving up 
healthcare costs in some markets.  In combination, however, these elements have the potential to 
effectively lower healthcare costs across each state.  There are multiple different methods for 
combining these two elements, which are discussed below. 
A. “VISIBLE VALUE” STANDARD CERTIFICATION 
Certification of health plans under the “Visible Value” standard through administrative or 
legislative action also has the ability to dismantle geographic tying and implement price 
transparency.  The Visible Value standard would be a set of criteria created by a state exchange 
or Department of Insurance whereby health plans could voluntarily submit cost, quality, and 
anticompetitive activities data to the exchange in order to apply for certification.  The exchange 
would then list these criteria on its website and indicate which plans on the exchange were 
certified under this standard.   
To receive certification, a health plan would need to meet three conditions.  First, the 
exchange boards, or other government agencies, would determine a plan’s best-value criteria by 
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evaluating the price and quality measures of each plan.  This data could be collected entirely by 
voluntary disclosure from each health plan as part of the application process. Second, a health 
plan must demonstrate it is not a product of any anticompetitive tactics, such as geographic tying 
leverage.  This may incentivize providers to refrain from anticompetitive activities in order to be 
included in a Visible Value standard health plan.  Third, a certified health plan must show that 
provider reimbursement rates are based on value-based payment systems, rather than on a fee-
for-service basis.  These three conditions, along with the subsequent criteria, could be made 
transparent to consumers via publication on a state exchange website.  With the proper consumer 
education, this initiative not only incentivizes health plans to meet these best-value standards, but 
also has the benefit of helping to usher consumers toward these plans. 
Through these mandated disclosures, the certification process stands to provide states 
with health plans of great value and integrity.  If a large number of consumers purchase Visible 
Value standard plans, more insurer-provider partnerships may be motivated to follow suit. 
B. EMPLOYER-LED LEVERAGE FLIP 
Taking a market-based approach, a second solution would use education initiatives to 
inform employer healthcare purchasing incentives.  This strategy would encourage employers to 
exercise their leverage as purchasers and demand price transparency from providers and insurers.  
In geographic markets where consumers have a wide range of choices among physicians and 
hospitals, initiatives to improve education and make information more widely available would 
empower healthcare purchasers to force sellers to compete with one another in the market.  In 
those markets where price transparency is most likely to be effective, this strategy would enable 
employers to demand the price and quality information they need.  In contrast, markets with 
fewer competing parties would see minimal effects from employer-driven demand for 
transparency and thus should not be targeted. 
Education initiatives should focus on making human resources departments aware of the 
potential cost savings they can achieve by highlighting and incentivizing lower-cost healthcare 
options for their employees and offering narrower and more efficient provider networks.  
Healthcare consumers have grown increasingly cost-conscious in recent years,262 so they are 
more likely to be responsive to financial incentives.  By encouraging employers to demand 
smaller, high-value provider networks, it is possible to harness this cost-awareness and thereby 
give the employer-purchasers of healthcare an increasing amount of bargaining power against 
dominant sellers.  Self-insured employers are in a particularly good position to lower their costs 
in this way by encouraging their employees to make more efficient healthcare purchasing 
decisions in exchange for lower premiums and out of pocket expenses. 
To make these initiatives most effective, the analysis of, and education about, healthcare 
options should be driven by a multi-stakeholder organization.  Including representatives from 
business, provider, insurer, and consumer groups can ensure an even-handed analysis of 
healthcare value that fully considers all perspectives and potential costs and benefits.  Once 
appropriately informed with objective information, employers could use their new power as fully 
informed purchasers to match the negotiating leverage of providers and insurers.  Consequently, 
dominant parties would be less able to hide price information or engage in other anticompetitive 
tactics like tying the purchase of their services in one market to those in other markets. 
 
C. HEALTHCARE MARKET REGIONS 
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A third mechanism for implementing both necessary elements is promulgating regulation 
through the State Department of Insurance or similar government agency to divide the state into 
independent healthcare regions and, simultaneously, mandate price transparency in the more 
competitive regions.  The independent regions would represent distinct product markets that 
would prevent dominant providers from abusing their market power in one market by coercing 
the purchase of their services in another.  Unlike the difficulty of proving distinct markets posed 
by antitrust litigation,263 this regulatory initiative would clearly outline each region, eliminating 
providers’ defense that they are merely selling services in a single, state-wide market.  The 
creation of the regions would serve to eliminate the existing geographic ties among regions, 
thereby breaking up market power and forcing providers to negotiate rates for their distinct 
geographic services.264 
 The Dartmouth Healthcare Atlas has established regional healthcare divisions throughout 
the United States and currently collects data on a wide range of factors for Medicare patients 
living in each region.265  A state could either use the regions created by the Atlas or set up its 
own regional division of healthcare communities.  While we recommend splitting these regions 
further into smaller markets, some markets, such as that for organ transplantation, would 
necessarily extend beyond regional boundaries depending on certain healthcare services offered. 
Therefore it will be important to specify services when arranging these geographic markets. 
 The division of a state into separate healthcare markets should be done in a manner to 
satisfy the antitrust requirements for defining a geographic market, such that buyers would be 
unable to switch to alternative sellers in sufficient numbers to defeat an exercise of market power 
by firms in the area.266  Further, healthcare delivery and other data collected could be reviewed 
regularly to track market power abuses.   
 The second half of the regulation would mandate disclosure of healthcare price 
information negotiated by insurers and providers.  However, the law would require price 
transparency only in those regions where “must-have” providers and providers supplying unique 
services within that market cannot use excessive leverage to demand higher costs.267  Mandated 
price transparency in regions with great provider leverage may result in a rise in healthcare costs 
to consumers.  As a result, it will be important to first identify those regions where transparent 
pricing information would most likely result in lower healthcare costs, and mandate that insurers 
and providers reveal their negotiated prices in those regions.  A mechanism for monitoring each 
region by a government entity such as the Department of Insurance may be necessary to 
determine which regions will require these regulations in the future.  For added enforcement, the 
regulation should also include a provision for regulatory sanctions and alert providers to the 
possibility of antitrust litigation. 
 Although not as precise as a geographic tying claim in an antitrust lawsuit, the creation of 
distinct geographic regions can weaken market coercion when accompanied by price 
transparency initiatives in those regions most receptive to the positive effects of market 
competition. 
                                                 
263
 See supra Part V.A.5.d; see also Alessi, supra note 203 (arguing that one of the most significant hurdles to 
establishing a geographic tying claim would be proving that separate geographic markets served by a single hospital 
network constitute distinct product markets capable of being tied together). 
264
 This regulation may not, however, prevent providers from tying services between submarkets.  
265
 Data by Region, DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/data/region (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2012). 
266
 Hospital Corporation of America, 106 F.T.C. 361 (1985).  
267
 See supra Part V.B. 
47 WILLIAM & MARY POLICY REVIEW [VOL. 4:319
 
D. ANTITRUST LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION/REGULATION 
The combination of bringing an antitrust suit to break apart and prevent anticompetitive 
tying and passing legislation or regulation to mandate price transparency has the potential to 
reduce costs through improving competition.  Simultaneously requiring price transparency and 
reducing anticompetitive behavior could make prices both visible and fair.  The antitrust suit 
would likely challenge providers’ higher prices derived from anticompetitive ties linking 
geographic markets and/or unrelated services.268  Even the specter of a successful suit could 
reduce provider willingness to leverage their power to demand uncompetitive prices.  
 For this approach to work, antitrust litigation must take place prior to legislative or 
regulatory change.  Although transparent prices would allow the Attorney General to use 
discovery to gather useful data to inform an antitrust suit, because of the uncertain outcomes of 
enacting price transparency alone in regions where providers or insurers have substantial 
leverage,269 the first step in this process should be using antitrust litigation to break down and 
discourage anticompetitive uses of market leverage.270  The results of the lawsuit could then be 
used to drive support for potential legislation or regulation. 
Despite the potential benefits of this combination of antitrust litigation and legislative or 
regulatory change, there is a high risk of failure.  The antitrust lawsuit may fail at a number of 
stages: The given Attorney General may not be interested in prosecuting the case; the court may 
reject the geographic tying claim;271 or the lawsuit may fail for a number of other reasons, 
including the inability to obtain price information due to its trade secret status or to gather other 
requisite facts to establish liability.  Notably, filing an antitrust lawsuit does not guarantee the 
disclosure of healthcare pricing information during discovery, particularly if that information is 
under a protective order to preserve its confidentiality.272  This may prove to be a substantial 
obstacle.  Even if the antitrust suit does succeed, which could take a number of years, it may be 
difficult to achieve the hoped-for legislative or regulatory measures to make prices transparent in 
a meaningful way.  Therefore, although this combination has great potential to benefit 
consumers, these contingencies suggest the benefits may not be easy to obtain even with a 
significant investment in data collection.  In the end, this approach requires a substantial 
investment of time, money, and manpower, with uncertain prospects for success. 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The above recommendations combine the breaking apart of geographic regions and the 
requirement of price transparency to create an effective attack on rising healthcare prices.  In 
addition to each of these recommendations, other solutions discussed in Section VII could also 
be implemented separately to further ensure the greatest level of success.  The first of these two 
solutions is stringent evaluation of all insurance premium increases of 5% or more by the 
Department of Insurance.  The second solution is the implementation of consumer-education 
initiatives.  The most important aspect of any price transparency initiative will be the education 
provided to employers and consumers about the newly available price and quality information.  
Without an understanding of how this information can help each group make more informed 
healthcare decisions and save on healthcare costs, simply making prices and quality scores 
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available to the public will not have the desired effect of lowering the cost of healthcare.  But, by 
providing employers and consumers with meaningful and transparent information about their 
healthcare choices and ensuring that those choices are not exploitative, a well-crafted price 
transparency initiative can begin to reduce the inefficiencies that characterize the healthcare 
market and make healthcare more affordable.  
 
  
